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THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLECTUAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Peter Lee* 
Abstract: This Article explores the concept of intellectual infrastructure in intellectual 
property law. It makes three principal contributions. First, it builds upon prior work to 
elaborate an infrastructure-based theory of productivity that encompasses trademark, 
copyright, and patent law. It is well-recognized that intellectual property law promotes 
productivity through allowing exclusive rights on refined intellectual creations such as 
source-identifying marks, particularized expressions, and specific inventions. Somewhat less 
appreciated, these bodies of law also promote productivity through ensuring wide access to 
productivity-enabling “intellectual infrastructure,” such as generic words, ideas, and natural 
principles, by making these assets ineligible for exclusive rights. This Article argues that this 
distinction between refined “applications,” which are eligible for exclusive rights, and 
foundational infrastructure, which remains subject to liberal access, is critical to promoting 
commercial, creative, and inventive activity throughout intellectual property law. 
Second, this Article offers a social account of the definition and evolution of intellectual 
infrastructure. Infrastructure is a dynamic entity, and intellectual creations subject to 
exclusive rights can “evolve into” infrastructure through widespread social appropriation. For 
example, trademarks can evolve into generic words, particularized expressions can develop 
into stock literary devices, and inventions can become standard platforms for technological 
development. This Article argues that trademark and copyright law employ social feedback 
mechanisms to relax exclusive rights on assets that become intellectual infrastructure and 
further contends that the absence of such mechanisms in patent law may inhibit technological 
progress. Trademark and copyright doctrines such as genericide, the idea-expression 
dichotomy, and the scenes a faire doctrine dynamically relegate refined intellectual creations 
to the public domain as they achieve infrastructural status. Patent law lacks an analogous 
mechanism for liberalizing access to patented inventions that achieve this status, such as 
isolated, purified human embryonic stem cells and information technology standards. While 
patent law’s relatively short term of protection mitigates the harshness of exclusive rights on 
foundational technologies, this one-size-fits-all approach ignores the reality that certain 
inventions can become infrastructure well before expiration of the patent term, particularly in 
rapidly advancing industries such as biotechnology and information technology. 
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Third, this Article draws on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C.1 to propose a social feedback mechanism for liberalizing access to 
patented infrastructure. Specifically, it argues that courts in patent infringement cases should 
deny injunctions and allow liability rule protection for patented inventions used as 
infrastructure. Rather than simply relegating these foundational technologies to the public 
domain, this approach enhances access to patented infrastructure while maintaining 
incentives to invent. 
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In certain circumstances, a newly introduced technology can quickly 
achieve the status of basic infrastructure that critically enables wide 
arrays of subsequent innovation.2 Patents, which confer exclusive rights 
for twenty years, on these foundational technologies may inhibit this 
subsequent innovation, particularly in rapidly advancing fields. For 
example, in biotechnology, patents on foundational resources such as 
human embryonic stem cells3 and polymerase chain reaction,4 a basic 
laboratory technique for copying DNA, have raised concerns that such 
“upstream” patents may inhibit “downstream” research and 
                                                     
2. See infra Part I.A for an extended definition of infrastructure. 
3. See Christopher D. Hazuka, Supporting the Work of Lesser Geniuses: An Argument for 
Removing Obstructions to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157, 158 
(2002); Emily Singer, Stem Cells Stuck in Patent Quagmire, TECH. REV. (Apr. 24, 2006), available 
at http://www.technologyreview.com/biztech/16728 [hereinafter Singer, Stem Cells Stuck]; Jeanne 
F. Loring & Cathryn Campbell, Intellectual Property and Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 
311 SCIENCE 1716, 1716 (2006). 
4. See Cetus To Exact Royalties from PCR Sales; Probe Absolves Convicted Rapist, BIOTECH. 
NEWSWATCH, Sept. 5, 1988, at 7. 
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development.5 In the information technology realm, patents on 
interoperability standards, such as the JPEG protocol for photographic 
compression6 and the design of key memory chips,7 have sparked similar 
concerns from software and hardware developers who build their own 
innovations based on this infrastructure. The problem of exclusive rights 
on upstream, infrastructural resources has informed recent Supreme 
Court pronouncements,8 congressional patent reform proposals,9 and 
academic commentary,10 all of which suggest that the patent system may 
sometimes subvert, rather than advance, its constitutional objective to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”11 
The evolution of a novel, singular innovation into broadly used 
infrastructure is a phenomenon endemic to many creative fields. 
Language is highly dynamic, with fabricated neologisms such as 
“yuppie” and “e-mail” quickly becoming indispensable means of general 
communication. In the musical realm, the twelve-bar blues form was 
once a novel innovation, but ultimately became the standard platform for 
almost every blues, rock and roll, and country song.12 In the scientific 
                                                     
5. Of course, some argue that upstream patents promote downstream productivity because these 
patents provide incentives to create the foundational technologies that enable subsequent 
innovation. Compare Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (observing that upstream 
patents may inhibit scientific research) with id. at 538–39 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting that upstream patents encourage creating foundational technologies that 
enable downstream research). 
6. See Michael Kannellos, Forgent Settles JPEG Patent Cases, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov. 1, 2006, 
http://www.news.com/Forgent-settles-JPEG-patent-cases/2100-1014_3-6131574.html?tag=item. 
7. See In re Rambus Inc., No. 9302, Opinion of the Commission (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006); Pamela 
A. MacLean, ‘Rambus’ Ruling is a Standards Landmark, THE NAT’L L. J. (Oct. 23, 2006); Mark A. 
Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property Rules or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. 
L. REV. 783, 837−38 (2007). 
8. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2922 
(2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari) (“[S]ometimes too much 
patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ . . . .”). 
9. See Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 
2795, 109th Cong. (2005).  
10. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031, 1032 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding]; Peter Yun-hyoung Lee, Inverting the Logic of 
Scientific Discovery: Applying Common Law Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine to Constrain 
Patents on Biotechnology Research Tools, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 79, 81 (2005) [hereinafter Lee, 
Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery]; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can 
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–701 
(1998); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the 
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 37−38 (1991). 
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
12. Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special 
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realm, Thomas Kuhn has famously theorized that revolutionary 
scientific theories spark “paradigm shifts” that upset accepted 
worldviews—only to become dominant worldviews themselves that 
define the direction of “normal science.”13 In all of these contexts, 
exclusive rights on the germinal resource—a word, musical form, or 
scientific theory—can inhibit widespread appropriation of that asset and 
significantly burden downstream productivity. 
This Article explores this phenomenon throughout intellectual 
property law, focusing particularly on patent law. In so doing, it 
examines how trademark and copyright law deal with innovations that 
evolve into widely needed infrastructure. Intellectual property law is 
premised on the idea that granting exclusive rights to specific creations, 
such as particular brand names, expressions, or technical designs, will 
promote progress.14 However, these specific creations can quickly 
evolve into general infrastructure, such as when a trademark becomes a 
generic word, an expression develops into a stock literary device, or an 
invention emerges as a standard platform for technological development. 
As we will see, trademark and copyright law possess socially attentive 
mechanisms to relax protection on assets that evolve into widely needed 
infrastructure; patent law, as conventionally conceived, lacks this 
capability. This Article proposes such a mechanism that is specifically 
tailored to patent law. 
This Article makes three principal contributions. First, it extends 
previous work to elaborate an infrastructure-based theory of productivity 
that spans trademark, copyright, and patent law. In so doing, it argues 
that infrastructure plays a critical role in delineating the appropriate 
boundary between protectable and nonprotectable subject matter 
throughout intellectual property law. In trademark, copyright, and patent 
                                                     
Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 766−67 (2007). 
13. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10–22 (3d ed. 1996).  
14. Of course, “progress” is a highly contested concept. This Article focuses on the objective of 
promoting economic, creative, and inventive productivity that has long been central to intellectual 
property law. By focusing on progress as productivity, this inquiry avoids intractable problems such 
as evaluating whether contemporary artistic works represent aesthetic “progress” over classic 
works. This originalist, economic paradigm, however, leaves important issues of distributive justice 
and cultural recognition unresolved. See generally Symposium, Intellectual Property and Social 
Justice, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 559 (2006). While this Article does not directly address these 
concerns, it integrates cultural considerations with economic theory to show that even within the 
originalist paradigm, intellectual property must accommodate social and cultural evolution to 
effectively promote productivity. See Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 264 (2006) 
[hereinafter Sunder, IP3]. 
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law, raw materials such as generic words, abstract ideas, and natural 
principles constitute “intellectual infrastructure” that is not eligible for 
individual ownership.15 Open access to these foundational assets 
facilitates their broad exploitation by the public at large, thus promoting 
productivity. Conversely, trademark, copyright, and patent law only 
allow exclusive rights on particularized applications derived from this 
infrastructure: source-identifying marks, expressions, and inventions. 
The process of drawing from “raw” infrastructure to produce refined 
applications can be analogized to “cooking”—value enhancement 
through human manipulation.16 While open access is the appropriate 
productivity-enhancing property regime for infrastructure, exclusivity 
represents the appropriate productivity-enhancing property regime for 
applications: proprietary trademarks reduce search costs for consumers 
and enable fair competition, and exclusive rights in the patent and 
copyright contexts provide incentives to create. Applying opposite 
property regimes to infrastructure and application thus helps trademark, 
copyright, and patent law achieve their utilitarian ends. Accordingly, all 
three disciplines have developed doctrines to distinguish these two 
classes of intellectual assets.  
Second, this Article provides a social account of the evolution of 
intellectual infrastructure, and it reveals how trademark and copyright 
law dynamically accommodate this evolution while patent law does not. 
Through a different process of value enhancement—widespread social 
adoption and reliance—certain applications can become so indispensable 
to a broad range of downstream uses that they become infrastructure. For 
example, trademarked terms can enter the vernacular as generic words 
such as “aspirin” or “thermos.” Particularized expressions can become 
stock literary elements, such as the Swiss bank account that has become 
a standard plot device in international espionage stories. Inventions can 
                                                     
15. See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 
89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 928 (2005) (describing several examples of intellectual infrastructure in 
copyright and patent law) [hereinafter Frischmann, Economic Theory]. 
16. I use the terms “raw” and “cooked” differently than Claude Levi-Strauss, for whom they 
generally signify “natural” and “cultural” elements, respectively. See generally CLAUDE LEVI-
STRAUSS, THE RAW AND THE COOKED (John Weightman & Doreen Weightman trans., Harper & 
Row 1969); see also Bradford S. Simon, Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge: A 
Psychological Approach to Conflicting Claims of Creativity in International Law, 20 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1613, 1618 (2005). For my purposes, generally speaking, “raw” assets represent 
infrastructural building blocks for which enhanced access is appropriate while “cooked” assets are 
refined, particularized, and properly subject to exclusive rights. However, as I explore at length, this 
paradigm is complicated when a “cooked” asset achieve the status of infrastructure.  
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quickly become standard platforms for technological development, such 
as the technique for gene splicing, a fundamental innovation around 
which a significant portion of the biotechnology industry has coalesced. 
Through widespread adoption and reliance, applications can evolve into 
infrastructure. This in turn complicates the familiar productivity model 
wherein intellectual property law grants exclusive rights to applications 
while ensuring wide access to infrastructure. 
As this Article demonstrates, trademark and copyright law use social-
feedback mechanisms to relax exclusive rights on applications that have 
become infrastructure; patent law lacks such a mechanism, thus 
potentially inhibiting technological development. In trademark and 
copyright law, doctrines such as genericide, the idea-expression 
dichotomy, and the scenes a faire doctrine17 allow courts to consider 
social practice and norms in eliminating exclusive rights on applications 
that society has come to regard as infrastructural. Trademarks that 
become generic words lose their trademark status. Similarly, expressions 
that become stock literary devices are no longer eligible for copyright 
protection. “Retiring” exclusive rights on these infrastructural resources 
facilitates their unfettered use by the community at large. Patent law has 
no analogous, dynamic mechanism for liberalizing access to patented 
inventions that have achieved the status of infrastructure. Instead, it 
relies on a relatively short term of protection (twenty years) to provide 
“timely” access to foundational technologies. However, in fast-moving 
industries, patented inventions can become infrastructure well before the 
patent expires. Patent law’s rigidity is not only out of step with its 
intellectual property siblings, but it is also inconsistent with myriad real 
property doctrines that enhance access to proprietary infrastructure in 
response to evolving social needs. 
Third, having identified this deficiency in patent law, this Article 
offers a solution. Specifically, it draws from the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.18 to propose a case-
                                                     
17. In brief, the doctrine of genericity prohibits trademarks on generic words that signify entire 
product classes, such as “car” or “computer.” See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, 
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). The idea-expression dichotomy allows copyrights on 
particularized expressions, such as the text of a book and close paraphrasings, but not on general 
ideas, such as “boy meets girl.” See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d 
Cir. 1930). The scenes a faire doctrine prohibits copyright protection on standard, stock, or 
necessary expressions, such as the hackneyed Swiss bank account of the international spy genre. 
See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986). (This Article adopts the 
Anglicized version of “scenes a faire,” which courts also refer to as “scènes à faire.”) 
18. 547 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). 
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specific social feedback mechanism for liberalizing access to patented 
infrastructure. eBay replaces the Federal Circuit’s per se rule under 
which courts virtually automatically granted motions for injunctive relief 
upon a finding of patent infringement.19 Instead, courts must now apply 
the traditional, multi-factor equitable framework long used in non-patent 
cases to determine the appropriateness of injunctions.20 
This Article argues that courts should consider the infrastructural use 
of a patented invention when determining infringement remedies and, in 
certain circumstances, allow such use to continue by a downstream user 
contingent upon providing compensation to the patentee. This Article 
proposes a two-tiered system in which courts would continue to protect 
ordinary inventions not serving as infrastructure with a property rule (via 
injunctive relief) but would have the flexibility to protect patented 
inventions serving as infrastructure with a liability rule21 (via royalties). 
Inventions that would be eligible for liability rule treatment would 
satisfy three criteria: (1) they would constitute infrastructure, a concept I 
discuss at length in Part I.A; (2) the alleged infringer would be using the 
invention in an infrastructural manner; and (3) the invention would not 
be reasonably available through ordinary licensing. To be effective, 
liability rule protection would extend both to inventions that have clearly 
achieved infrastructural status, such as widely used, patented 
information technology standards, as well as to inventions whose limited 
availability demonstrates significant potential for infrastructural use, 
such as patented human embryonic stem cells. Although this proposal 
allows courts to determine an ongoing royalty for continued 
infringement of infrastructural inventions, a court-determined royalty 
would only represent a last resort if parties could not voluntarily 
negotiate a license. 
This proposal offers several significant advantages. First, it enhances 
patent law’s responsiveness to productivity dynamics in particular 
technological fields by relaxing exclusive rights on inventions as they 
become critical platforms for downstream development. This proposal 
mitigates the possibility that exclusive rights on infrastructural 
                                                     
19. Id. at 1839 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)). 
20. Id. 
21. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). While Calabresi 
and Melamed primarily discuss liability rules in the context of awarding one-time damages, I extend 
their framework to also include awarding ongoing royalties. 
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inventions will serve as a bottleneck that inhibits downstream 
productivity. Analyzing infrastructural status at the time of infringement, 
rather than upon patent issuance, allows courts to consider an 
invention’s social history and specific exploitation on a case-by-case 
basis when determining the appropriateness of enjoining infringement. 
Second, this proposal moves beyond the trademark and copyright 
contexts where a binary choice between open access and exclusive rights 
is adequate. Through applying liability rules, this Article offers a 
nuanced guide to use-specific, compensation-dependent access to 
patented infrastructural technologies. This approach enhances access to 
proprietary infrastructure while still maintaining incentives to invent. 
Third, while liability rules may serve as a useful judicial backstop to 
enhance access to patented infrastructure, this proposal maintains 
numerous opportunities for parties to voluntarily negotiate licenses. 
Furthermore, by changing the baseline conditions of these negotiations, 
this proposal may help reduce the transaction costs that often undermine 
private ordering. 
In addition to offering a concrete proposal for patent law, this inquiry 
holds implications that extend far beyond that single field. First, it 
highlights the methodological value of intradisciplinary comparison 
within intellectual property law in general.22 Although analogies are 
rarely perfect, and although trademark, copyright, and patent law exhibit 
significant theoretical and doctrinal differences, these fields can still 
borrow fruitfully from each other when solving certain shared problems. 
Second, this intradisciplinary comparison reveals a natural limitation on 
intellectual property rights, which are structured to maintain access to 
infrastructure and prevent pernicious intellectual monopolies.23 Finally, 
                                                     
22.  See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 205 (2003) (noting similarities between patent law’s exclusion of 
scientific and mathematical principles and copyright’s exclusion of ideas); Mark Lemley, The 
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997) (suggesting a 
copyright analog for “blocking patents”) [hereinafter Lemley, Economics of Improvement]; Oskar 
Liivak, Maintaining Competition in Copying: Narrowing the Scope of Gene Patents, 41 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 177 (2007) (applying the originality requirement to constrain gene patents); Oskar Liivak, 
The Forgotten Originality Requirement: A Constitutional Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 261 (2005) (applying the originality requirement, commonly associated 
with copyrights, to patent law); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent 
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (proposing an analog of copyright’s fair use doctrine for 
patent law); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 
(1991) (proposing reforms to the idea-expression dichotomy based on analogous concepts in patent 
law). 
23. This infrastructural insight bolsters criticisms of the ever-expanding nature of intellectual 
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this Article begins to reconcile progressive calls to enhance intellectual 
property law’s attentiveness to social context with this legal field’s 
traditional economic objective of promoting productivity.24 This Article 
shows that intellectual property law can only achieve its originalist goal 
of promoting productivity if it is sensitive to the evolving infrastructural 
needs of creative communities.25 
Part I argues that differential treatment of intellectual infrastructure 
and application is essential to promoting productivity in trademark, 
copyright, and patent law. Extending previous work,26 Part I provides a 
comprehensive account of intellectual property doctrines that distinguish 
nonprotectable infrastructure from protectable application: trademark’s 
doctrine of genericity; copyright’s idea-expression dichotomy and 
scenes a faire doctrine; and patent law’s prohibition against patenting 
natural laws, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.27 
Part II turns to real property to show both that infrastructure evolves 
and that legal doctrines respond to this evolution by liberalizing access 
to assets that become infrastructure. Society’s widespread use and 
reliance on productivity-enabling resources can transform them into 
infrastructure. Analogously, trademarked terms, particularized 
expressions, and specific inventions can “evolve” into infrastructure 
through society’s widespread use and reliance upon them as basic 
building blocks of communication and creation. Drawing from Professor 
Carol Rose’s concept of “inherently public property,” Part II shows how 
                                                     
property rights. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of 
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37−40 (2003). 
24. See Sunder, IP3, supra note 14, at 264 (urging scholars to integrate economic and cultural 
accounts of intellectual property). 
25. This analysis draws much from the “social relations” view of property rights associated with 
Joseph Singer. See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 
663 (1988) [hereinafter Singer, The Reliance Interest]. Ultimately, this Article suggests a more 
productive way for patents to mediate the relationship between upstream inventors and downstream 
users and society at large. 
26. See Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15; Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, 
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007). 
27. See supra note 17. The prohibition against patenting natural laws, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas excludes these entities from patentable subject matter, reserving exclusive rights only 
for particularized inventions. Related, though not identical, concerns over distinguishing 
nonprotectable infrastructure from protectable application also apply to the right of publicity. See 
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1512−23 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that an expansive right of publicity can inhibit 
subsequent creative expression). I here focus on the “core” intellectual property disciplines of 
trademark, copyright, and patent law. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in 
Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 885 (2007). 
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certain real property doctrines, such as eminent domain, public 
prescription, the public trust doctrine, and custom, relax exclusive rights 
on resources that are widely needed to promote productivity.28 Applied 
to intellectual property, these doctrines provide a model for liberalizing 
access to trademarks, expressions, and inventions that evolve into 
intellectual infrastructure. 
Part III then examines the extent to which various intellectual 
property doctrines accommodate the evolution of intellectual 
infrastructure. A striking continuum emerges. Trademark’s doctrine of 
genericity is highly attentive to evolving social meanings in determining 
when a trademarked term has become generic, thus warranting its 
preservation in the public domain as intellectual infrastructure. 
Copyright law occupies an intermediate position by ensuring access to 
expressive elements that society has come to recognize as “stock” or 
“standard” as nonprotectable infrastructure. At the far end of the 
continuum, patent law has no such social feedback mechanism. It is 
insensitive to demand-side29 considerations favoring broad access to 
patented inventions, such as isolated, purified human embryonic stem 
cells and information technology standards, that fundamentally enable 
downstream research and development. Part III acknowledges patent 
law’s differences from trademark and copyright law, but concludes that 
these differences do not fully justify patent law’s rigid approach. Among 
other considerations, it explains how patent law’s relatively short term of 
protection does not provide adequate access to foundational technologies 
that became infrastructure within a short time after patenting. 
Part IV presents a remedy. Moving beyond the all-or-nothing choice 
between open access and strict exclusive rights, Part IV proposes a 
workable model for use-specific, compensation-dependent access to 
patented infrastructure. This solution arises organically from the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 
which provides courts greater latitude to deny injunctions in patent 
infringement suits and to protect patents with a liability rule.30 I advocate 
                                                     
28. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 714, 720 (1986) [hereinafter Rose, The Comedy of the 
Commons]. 
29. In economic terms, demand-side considerations relate to the interests of consumers while 
supply-side considerations relate to the interests of producers. For patented infrastructure, such as 
isolated, purified human embryonic stem cells, demand-side considerations favor free access to 
these cells to facilitate their downstream exploitation by users. However, such open access would 
undermine producers’ supply-side incentives to invest in developing such cells in the first place. 
30. 547 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). 
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a two-tiered system in which inventions used in a non-infrastructural 
capacity would continue to receive property rule protection, but 
infrastructural use of a patented technology would weigh in favor of 
denying an injunction and protecting the patent with a liability rule. In 
the context of a particular infringement suit, courts would extend 
liability rule protection to a patented invention that: (1) comprises 
productivity-enhancing infrastructure, (2) was actually used by an 
alleged infringer in an infrastructural capacity, and (3) was not 
reasonably available through ordinary licensing. This approach would 
enhance access to patented infrastructure while still maintaining 
incentives to invent. 
I.  PROMOTING PRODUCTIVITY THROUGH LIBERAL 
ACCESS TO INTELLECTUAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Trademark, copyright, and patent law all promote productivity by 
applying opposing property regimes to intellectual infrastructure and 
application. This Article uses analogy to identify shared principles 
among these three fields,31 a method that courts and commentators have 
found fruitful.32 While one must acknowledge significant differences 
among these disciplines,33 these differences should not obscure 
significant conceptual and doctrinal similarities. Subject matter is the 
                                                     
31. See Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119, 152 
(2003) (comparing minorities in the shareholder and constitutional contexts and noting that “[s]uch 
intradisciplinarity seems especially appropriate to law, a discipline that relies on analogical 
reasoning”). 
32. See supra, note 22; eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 1840 (harmonizing patent law with 
traditional injunction practice applying to copyright law); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite 
Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2922–23 (2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (noting the similarity of patent law’s exclusion of scientific principles and 
copyright’s exclusion of ideas from protectable subject matter); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
201 (2003) (“Because the [constitutional] Clause empowering Congress to confer copyrights also 
authorizes patents, congressional practice with respect to patents informs our inquiry.”); Sony Corp. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (noting the “historic kinship” of copyright 
and patent law); United States ex rel. The Baldwin Co. v. Robertson, 265 U.S. 168, 180 (1924) 
(recognizing that Congress intended early trademark legislation to afford applicants the same 
equitable remedies available to patent applicants); Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, 
Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[J]ust as copyright law does not protect ideas . . . neither does 
trade dress law protect an idea, a concept, or a generalized type of appearance.”). 
33. Cf. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (noting that patent law extends further than 
copyright law in allowing exclusive rights on technical ideas); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 322 
(1871) (observing that trademarks, unlike copyrighted or patented works, need not be original to the 
creator). My arguments are based on functional analogies among these doctrines, not analytical 
identity. 
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most obvious point of convergence: intellectual property deals with 
exclusive rights in intangible assets. Broadly speaking, promoting 
progress through enhancing productivity is another commonality.34 
Accordingly, this Part first situates intellectual infrastructure in the 
shared utilitarian objectives of trademark, copyright, and patent law. It 
then presents an economic definition of infrastructure that helps explain 
why open access to this type of resource is critical to promoting 
productivity. Finally, this Part explores various doctrines that distinguish 
intellectual infrastructure from application: trademark’s genericity 
doctrine; copyright’s idea-expression dichotomy and scenes a faire 
doctrine; and patent law’s prohibition against patenting natural laws, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. 
A.  The Utilitarian Foundations of Intellectual Infrastructure 
At a general level, trademark, copyright, and patent law all aim to 
promote some type of progress, whether commercial, creative, or 
technological. As we will see, while granting exclusive rights on some 
kinds of intangible assets can promote progress, exclusive rights on 
other kinds can actually inhibit it. Of course, “progress” is a highly 
contested concept.35  In my analysis, I focus on traditional interpretations 
of progress in the intellectual property context that relate economic, 
creative, and inventive productivity to aggregate social welfare. 
Although this economic focus on ensuring marketplace efficiency and 
producing cultural and technological goods does not directly address 
questions such as whether some goods are aesthetically “better” than 
others,36 or whether they are equitably distributed,37 it holds great 
currency in intellectual property doctrine. As others have argued, 
economic, cultural, and other theories all have roles to play in explaining 
                                                     
34. Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 10, at 1031 (“Intellectual property protection in the United 
States has always been about generating incentives to create.”). 
35. See Sunder, IP3, supra note 14, at 284 (“The utilitarian approach to intellectual property does 
not ask: Who makes the goods? Who profits, and at whose expense?”); Anupam Chander & 
Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1332 (2004) 
(emphasizing distributional concerns in intellectual property law); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and 
Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1162−70 (2007) [hereinafter Cohen, 
Creativity and Culture]; Brett Frischmann, Cultural Environmentalism and the Wealth of Networks, 
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1096 (2007) (noting multiple conceptions of “progress,” one of which 
involves promoting widespread participation in creative activities). 
36. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (cautioning 
against judicial evaluations of artistic merit in copyright cases). 
37. See Sunder, IP3, supra note 14, at 284. 
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and critiquing intellectual property.38 Indeed, as I hope to show, 
attentiveness to the evolving needs of creative communities is essential 
for intellectual property to achieve is traditional economic objectives. 
Trademark, copyright, and patent law all exhibit a strongly utilitarian 
character. Trademarks confer exclusive rights to “marks,” such as brand 
names, logos, and even distinctive product designs, which firms can use 
to identify their particular goods and services in the marketplace. 
Although trademarks, unlike copyrights and patents, do not provide 
direct incentives to create,39 they ultimately aim to promote 
productivity.40 In enacting the Lanham Act,41 the framework for federal 
trademark law, Congress intended to foster competition and enhance 
general consumer welfare.42 Trademarks reduce search costs for 
consumers,43 prevent public deception,44 and mitigate free-riding by 
imitators.45 While protecting reputable firms suggests a moral desert 
basis for trademark law, this theory falters given that despite a trademark 
owner’s well-established reputation and substantial marketing efforts, 
any trademark that becomes generic is subject to cancellation.46 While 
traditional notions of commercial morality and unfair competition 
inform trademark doctrine, its modern formulation features a strong 
utilitarian emphasis on streamlining market transactions. 
The utilitarian character of copyright and patent law arises most 
clearly from their constitutional objective “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.”47 While copyright offers some protection for 
                                                     
38. Id. at 264; see Cohen, Creativity and Culture, supra note 35, at 1155−62. 
39. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE 
L.J. 1687, 1695 (1999) [hereinafter Lemley, Lanham Act]. 
40. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22, at 166. 
41. Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1051–1141 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)). 
42. S. REP. NO. 1333, at 3−5 (1946); see Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 
189, 198 (1985); Ralph S. Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade 
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167 (1948) (describing how trademarks serve both private and public 
interests). 
43. Lemley, Lanham Act, supra note 39, at 1690. 
44. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323 (1871); see Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617, 620 (1879); 
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767−78 (1992) (noting that the Lanham Act 
seeks to prevent deceptive marks and protect firms against unfair competition). But see Mark P. 
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841 
(2007) (emphasizing that early trademark law sought to protect producers, not consumers). 
45. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). 
46. See infra Part I.B.1. 
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. By comparison, federal trademark law relies on the Commerce 
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authors’ “moral rights,”48 its doctrinal basis has traditionally been 
understood as utilitarian.49 Although the “immediate effect” of copyright 
law “is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor,” the 
“ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the 
general public good.”50 
Patent law is similarly instrumental, with the constitutional objective 
of promoting technological progress51 acting as a limiting condition on 
Congress’s power over the patent system.52 The Supreme Court has 
recognized that the “ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new 
designs and technologies into the public domain through disclosure.”53 
                                                     
Clause for constitutional authorization. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
48. Moral rights, which hold great currency in Continental copyright law, protect copyrighted 
works as extensions of an author’s persona and do not arise from an explicitly utilitarian aim to 
encourage production of such works. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. 
L. REV. 957 (1982) (arguing that ownership of property is essential to realizing one’s individual 
potential, and laying the foundation for justifying copyright as protecting the integrity of the 
author’s persona); Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author 
Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 383–88 (1993) (discussing moral 
rights); see Douglas Y’Barbo, The Heart of the Matter: The Property Right Conferred by Copyright, 
49 MERCER L. REV. 643, 659−60 (1998) (describing the incentives and personhood paradigms for 
copyright). United States copyright law does offer limited protection of moral rights for certain 
kinds of visual art. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000) (codifying the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990); 
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories:” Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights and 
Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5, 26 (2001). 
49. But see Sunder, IP3, supra note 14, at 286−88 (noting that moral rather than efficiency 
concerns animated the Supreme Court’s ruling in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)).  
50. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see H.R. REP. NO. 60-
2222, at 7 (1909); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (characterizing Congress’s 
“constitutional command” as creating “a ‘system’ that ‘promote[s] the Progress of Science’”); Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (rejecting the so-called “sweat of the 
brow” theory of copyright); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The 
copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”); Fox 
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States and the 
primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the 
labors of the authors.”); see also Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. 
L. REV. 79, 83 (1989) (“The function of copyright is to promote creativity and the dissemination of 
creative works, so that the public may benefit from the labor of authors.”) [hereinafter Kurtz, The 
Scenes a Faire Doctrine]. 
51. Some scholars debate the original meaning of “progress” in the Constitution. See, e.g., Malla 
Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed To Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 
754, 755 (2001) (arguing that progress in this context means “diffusion”). 
52. See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). 
53. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989). But see Timothy R. 
Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 131−38 (2006) (arguing that the 
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While acknowledging the valuable contributions of inventors,54 the 
Court has accordingly rejected any moral rights or Lockean labor theory 
justifications for granting patents.55 
While exclusive rights on intangible assets can advance productivity, 
they can also inhibit it. In trademark, exclusive rights on brand names 
and logos lower transactions costs and enhance competition. In 
copyright and patent law, exclusive rights establish incentives to create 
expressive works and inventions. This model equates property rights 
with productivity.56 However, ownership is not a natural right but is 
contingent on promoting productivity.57 As such, all three disciplines 
must address a shared question: what happens when conferring exclusive 
rights actually inhibits progress?58 After all, trademarks on generic 
words might hamper commerce, and copyrights and patents on ideas and 
natural principles might inhibit downstream productivity. 
Accordingly, all three disciplines possess functional doctrines to limit 
exclusive rights to facilitate subsequent productivity. Specifically, all 
three disciplines distinguish nonprotectable intellectual infrastructure 
from protectable intellectual application.59 Infrastructure includes 
generic words, creative ideas, stock literary devices, natural laws, 
physical phenomena, and abstract technical ideas. These basic building 
blocks of communication, expression, and invention reside in the public 
domain for all to use.60 Infrastructure enables productivity, and its wide 
                                                     
disclosure requirement is inconsistent with prevailing theories justifying the patent system). 
54. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (“An 
inventor . . . gives something of value to the community by adding to the sum of human 
knowledge.”). 
55. See Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330−31 (1945) (“The 
primary purpose of our patent system is not reward of the individual but the advancement of the arts 
and sciences.”); id. at 331 n.1 (noting that the purpose of patents is “much deeper and the effect 
much wider than individual gain”) (quoting TNEC Hearings, Part 3, p. 857). 
56.  See Cohen, Creativity and Culture, supra note 35, at 1170 (“A legal regime meant to 
promote progress requires a set of premises about the ways in which progress develops.”). See 
generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) 
(arguing that property rights help internalize externalities and thus encourage efficient resource 
exploitation). 
57. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 9. 
58. Most commentators have focused on this shared concern between copyright and patent. See, 
e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 22, at 1180. However, productivity concerns also inform trademark’s 
doctrine of genericity. See Part I.B.1. 
59. I make no claim to coining “intellectual infrastructure.” See Frischmann, Economic Theory, 
supra note 15, at 990−1003. 
60. These assets occupy one region of the public domain, alongside creative works and inventions 
for which the protected terms have expired, assets dedicated to the public, and other resources 
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availability in the public domain allows for its broadest possible 
exploitation. Individuals work from these “raw” materials to produce 
“cooked” creations eligible for exclusive rights: source-identifying 
marks, particularized texts, and specific inventions. 
In elaborating the concept of intellectual infrastructure, I extend the 
work of Professors Brett Frischmann and Mark Lemley.61 Professor 
Frischmann presents a demand-side economic model that defines an 
infrastructural resource as satisfying three criteria: (1) the resource is at 
least partially nonrival; (2) it derives its primary social value from 
facilitating downstream productive activity; and (3) it serves as an input 
into a wide range of goods and services, including private, public, and 
nonmarket goods.62 Extended to intellectual property, intangible 
resources satisfying these criteria qualify as intellectual infrastructure.63 
These resources facilitate broad arrays of downstream activity, thus 
creating a powerful demand-side argument for making them widely 
available in the public domain.64 
The first criterion, nonrivalry, indicates that within certain limits, 
additional consumption of infrastructure does not diminish its 
availability for others to use. For example, subject to constraints of 
congestion, additional users in a telephone network do not diminish that 
network’s overall capacity to facilitate communication.65 Intangible 
assets such as words, ideas, and natural principles exhibit perfect 
nonrivalry because additional “consumption” of these resources does not 
diminish their availability at all,66 thus well-suiting them for open 
access. 
                                                     
ineligible for exclusive rights. See Pamela Samuelson, Challenges in Mapping the Public Domain, 
in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 7−25 
(Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006). These other assets also function as 
infrastructural elements. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, at 291. However, I focus here 
on “pure” intellectual infrastructure that is never eligible for individual ownership, such as generic 
words, abstract ideas, and natural principles. 
61. See Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26. 
62. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 956. 
63. See id. at 990−1003. 
64. See id. at 922−23; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, at 282 (“Frischmann’s organizing 
heuristic is ‘if infrastructure, then commons.’”). 
65.  See Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 953−55. 
66. See VI THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180−81 (H.A. Washington ed., 1871) 
(describing ideas as “expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any point”). 
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The second criterion emphasizes that infrastructure is “intermediate”: 
its primary social value resides in enabling downstream productivity.67 
The value of words, ideas, and natural principles in the utilitarian 
context of the intellectual property system derives largely from their role 
as means—enablers of commercial transactions, creative expressions, 
and tangible inventions—rather than as ends in and of themselves.68 
The third criterion reflects infrastructure’s ability to enable a wide 
array of downstream activities.69 While many resources, from beakers to 
mechanical pencils, are inputs into downstream production chains, 
infrastructure is different. Intellectual infrastructure, such as words, 
ideas, and natural principles, contributes to an extremely wide range of 
downstream applications, as well as to many kinds of applications, 
including private, public, and nonmarket goods.70 
As Frischmann and Lemley recognize, several intellectual property 
doctrines operate to keep intellectual infrastructure in the public domain. 
These include subject matter exclusions such as copyright’s idea-
expression dichotomy and the nonpatentability of abstract ideas.71 
Additionally, use-specific exclusions such as the fair use defense also 
permit the infrastructural exploitation of certain copyrighted materials.72 
I build upon Frischmann and Lemley’s work in several ways. Under 
the rubric of intellectual infrastructure, I include trademark’s doctrine of 
genericity,73 copyright’s idea-expression dichotomy and scenes a faire 
doctrine,74 and the prohibition against patenting natural laws, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.75 I therefore bring trademark into the 
fold and extend infrastructure theory to previously unexamined doctrines 
                                                     
67. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 957. 
68. COMM. ON MEASURING & IMPROVING INFRASTRUCTURE PERFORMANCE, NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, MEASURING AND IMPROVING INFRASTRUCTURE PERFORMANCE 5 (1995) (“Infrastructure 
is a means to other ends, and the effectiveness, efficiency, and reliability of its contribution to these 
other ends must ultimately be the measures of infrastructure performance.”). 
69. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 957−58. 
70. Id. Given the functional definition of infrastructure, the line separating infrastructure from 
application may not always be clear. Furthermore, the same asset may constitute infrastructure in 
one context and non-infrastructural application in another. See infra Part IV.D. 
71. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 1003; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, 
at 284−92. 
72. See Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 1002−03; Frischmann & Lemley, supra 
note 26, at 286−90. 
73. See infra Part I.B.1. 
74. See infra Part I.B.2. 
75. See infra Part I.B.3. See supra notes 17, 27. 
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in copyright and patent law. This comprehensive analysis shows that 
maintaining wide access to infrastructure is essential to advancing 
productivity throughout intellectual property law. Conversely, it 
highlights the significant productivity losses that can result from 
exclusive rights on intellectual infrastructure.76 
B. The Doctrinal Framework for Intellectual Infrastructure 
1. Trademarks: Genericity 
Through the doctrine of genericity, trademark law maintains the 
intellectual infrastructure of generic words in the public domain.77 Taco 
Bell cannot trademark the term “quesadilla,” which is a generic word 
signifying a general class of products.78 However, it can trademark 
“Crunchwrap Supreme” because this distinctive term signifies a single 
product unique to that firm.  
Importantly, genericity operates in a dynamic fashion over time. Ex 
ante, terms that already represent the “common descriptive name” of a 
product category, such as “car” or “computer,” are not eligible for 
trademark protection.79 Ex post, even fabricated terms such as “aspirin” 
and “cellophane,” which originated as trademarks, can lose their 
protected status if they become the generic signifiers of entire classes of 
products.80 Thus, a registered mark is subject to cancellation if it 
becomes the generic name for the good or service for which it is 
registered.81 This illustrates the phenomenon of genericide, which also 
                                                     
76. For a related argument for liberalizing access to infrastructure in the antitrust context, see 
Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Essential Facilities, Infrastructure, and Open Access 
(Nov. 2, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=942074. 
77. Trademarks are distinctive words, phrases, designs, or logos used by individuals and firms to 
uniquely identify their products and services to consumers. The Lanham Act protects both 
“registered” and “unregistered” marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000) (describing rules for registering 
trademarks); 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000) (establishing so-called “federal common law protection” for 
unregistered marks). Under both systems, generic terms are not protectable. 
78. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
79. See Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 100−01 (2d Cir. 1989); 
Hans Zeisel, The Surveys that Broke Monopoly, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 896, 896 (1983). 
80. DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1936) (invalidating the 
trademark on “cellophane” in certain contexts); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 515–16 
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding similarly for “aspirin”).  
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2000). Genericity has its roots in the common law of trademarks. 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 (1995). 
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applies to trampoline, yo-yo, brassiere, escalator, thermos,82 and “You 
Have Mail,”83 all of which lost trademark status upon entering the 
vernacular as generic words. Ultimately, keeping generic words—a 
species of intellectual infrastructure—in the public domain helps 
promote commercial transactions and prevents firms from leveraging 
trademarks into economic monopolies. 
Generic words satisfy the three criteria for infrastructure because they 
are: (1) nonrival assets that are (2) valuable as inputs (3) into a wide 
array of downstream uses.84 While trademarks such as “IBM” share 
these attributes to a certain degree, the social value and potential uses of 
a generic word such as “computer” far outstrip that of any particular 
trademark, thus rendering exclusive rights on generic words inherently 
problematic.85 As the Fifth Circuit has observed, “[a] generic term 
connotes the ‘basic nature of articles or services’ rather than the more 
individualized characteristics of a particular product.”86 In a sense, 
generic language is the ultimate infrastructure because it is the essential 
foundation for all communication.87 
Keeping generic words in the public domain serves trademark’s 
utilitarian objectives in several ways. First, generic words such as 
“hamburger” cannot fulfill the source-identifying function of trademarks 
because they describe general product classes, not particular products.88 
Thus, their use as trademarks would be unhelpful and potentially 
confusing to consumers seeking particular goods and services. Second, 
at a broader level, limiting exclusive rights through genericide prevents 
                                                     
82. John Dwight Ingram, The Genericide of Trademarks, 2 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 154, 154 
(2004). 
83. Am. Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 818–23 (4th Cir. 2001). 
84. See Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 956−58 
85. Cf. Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 
1324 (1980) (“[C]ourts have assumed that granting or maintaining exclusive rights to generic words 
would unfairly and injuriously deprive competing manufacturers, consumers, and the public of the 
right to call an article by its name.”). 
86. Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting 
Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 11 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
87. Accordingly, scholars have recognized a First Amendment basis for preventing exclusive 
rights over generic words. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as 
Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, 
Expressive Genericity]. 
88. See Lemley, Lanham Act, supra note 39, at 1695 (“[T]he economic case for brands and 
advertising is undone to the extent that trademarks are used in ways that affirmatively confuse 
consumers.”). 
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unfair competition.89 If Gatorade trademarked the generic term “sports 
drink,” then POWERade and All Sport would be liable for infringement 
if they sold their products using the same name.90 Consumers might 
eventually believe that only Gatorade produced “sports drinks.” 
Extrapolating beyond the single confused consumer, a firm could 
leverage a linguistic monopoly over a generic term into an economic 
monopoly, a possibility that the genericity doctrine seeks to foreclose.91  
Accordingly, genericity ensures open access to a shared linguistic 
infrastructure, thus permitting consumers and firms to communicate 
effectively.92 Conversely, it reserves exclusive rights for terms that are 
inherently distinctive or have achieved secondary meaning in the minds 
of consumers and that can effectively function as market signaling 
devices. In tandem, this differential treatment of infrastructure and 
application helps trademark law enhance competition and prevent 
consumer deception. 
2. Copyrights: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and Scenes a Faire 
Doctrine 
Copyright law, like trademark law, distinguishes between 
nonprotectable intellectual infrastructure and protectable intellectual 
application.93 However, the reason for this distinction is different: 
                                                     
89. Conversely, the legislative history of the Lanham Act states that “[t]rade-marks, indeed, are 
the very essence of competition, because they make possible a choice between competing 
articles. . . .” S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946); H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 3 (1945). 
90. Trademark law allows competitors to make “fair use” of a descriptive mark held by another 
firm for the purpose of describing their products. Analogizing to our hypothetical example in which 
trademark law allowed marks on generic terms, a similar fair use exception might allow firms to use 
“sports drink” in a descriptive sense. However, Gatorade’s exclusive right to use that term in a 
trademark fashion would still confer a significant competitive advantage. See Zatarain’s, Inc., 698 
F.2d at 701 (describing the fair use exception for descriptive uses of marks). 
91. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323 (1871) (holding that no one can claim “exclusive use of 
a trade-mark or trade-name which would practically give him a monopoly in the sale of any goods 
other than those produced or made by himself”); see Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 
373, 382 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that preventing monopolies represents “[t]he ‘guiding principle’ in 
distinguishing protectable from non-protectable marks”); cf. Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 
141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003). 
92. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 802 (1941) (“One who 
wishes to communicate his thoughts to others must force the raw material of meaning into defined 
and recognizable channels.”). 
93. In general, copyrights confer a set of time-limited exclusive rights over original literary, 
expressive, musical, and aesthetic works, including computer software, that are fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression. 
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copyright law draws this distinction not to enhance communication 
between firms and consumers but to maintain creative infrastructure in 
the public domain as the raw building blocks of expression. Copyright 
possesses several doctrines to draw this distinction,94 all of which are 
conceptually related to the idea-expression dichotomy. As elaborated in 
precedent and statute,95 copyright protection extends only to the 
particularized expression of a work (and minor deviations from this 
expression)96 and not to a work’s general ideas. Distinguishing between 
ideas and expressions promotes productivity by keeping infrastructural 
raw materials freely available to all authors while maintaining incentives 
to create particularized expressions.97 
The idea-expression dichotomy keeps a certain type of intellectual 
infrastructure—ideas—in the public domain. Applying Frischmann’s 
criteria,98 ideas are: (1) nonrival, (2) valuable as means to creative 
expression, and (3) inputs into a wide range of ends (consider how many 
stories can arise from ideas such as “love story” and “alien invasion”).99 
While the idea-expression dichotomy applies to ideas that are inherently 
nonprotectable from their inception (such as “love story”), I will later 
show that it also renders nonprotectable certain intellectual creations that 
become “ideas” through common use.100 Ultimately, relegating these 
infrastructural resources to the public domain helps facilitate creative 
productivity. 
                                                     
94. These include the fact-expression dichotomy, functionality doctrine, scenes a faire doctrine, 
and merger doctrine. See generally Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) 
(explaining the fact-expression dichotomy); Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 
F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987) (addressing the functionality doctrine); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 
1352 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussing the scenes a faire doctrine); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 
379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (describing the merger doctrine). 
95. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (excluding from protection “any idea, procedure, process, system, 
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery”). The idea-expression dichotomy applies not 
only to literary ideas but also to the technical ideas embodied in functional works. See Baker v. 
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (holding that copyright protection, which is easy to obtain and relatively 
lengthy, is inappropriate for technical ideas, which should only be eligible for protection based on 
patent law’s more rigorous examination standards). See generally Pamela Samuelson, Why 
Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1921 (2007).  
96. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
97. See Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 1221, 1224 (1993) [hereinafter Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost]. 
98. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 956−58 
99. See id. at 957−58 
100. See infra Part III.B.1. 
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Related to the idea-expression dichotomy is the “scenes a faire” 
doctrine, which similarly maintains intellectual infrastructure in the 
public domain. Relative to the idea-expression dichotomy, the scenes a 
faire doctrine is even more explicitly dynamic: it relegates items to the 
public domain as they become stock and standard infrastructure.101 
While courts vary in precisely how they define a scene a faire102 and in 
how they apply this doctrine,103 the doctrine generally excludes from 
copyright protection certain “‘incidents, characters or settings which are 
as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment 
of a given topic.’”104 For example, in international espionage stories, 
copyright protection will not attach to the inclusion of Swiss bank 
accounts and femme fatales unless those elements are somehow 
particularized beyond their standard treatments.105 Like ideas, scenes a 
faire are also infrastructural, for they constitute the “elements of 
creation, a vocabulary needed to create a work.”106 These stock elements 
flow necessarily from common nonprotectable ideas107 and represent the 
raw materials of expression. Accordingly, the scenes a faire doctrine 
ensures that this creative vocabulary is freely available to all authors.  
Differential treatment of infrastructure and application by both the 
idea-expression dichotomy and the scenes a faire doctrine promotes 
creative productivity. As Professor Leslie Kurtz observes, “[t]he 
idea/expression dichotomy helps copyright strike a balance between 
providing incentives to create and maintaining the store of raw materials 
needed for new creations.”108 This concern with preventing exclusive 
rights on ideas also informs the merger doctrine, which provides that 
“[w]hen there is essentially only one way to express an idea, the idea and 
its expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to copying that 
expression.”109 While expressions are the traditional subjects of 
                                                     
101. See infra Part III.B.2. 
102. See Kurtz, The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, supra note 50, at 82. 
103. Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scènes à Faire and Merger 
Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779, 799–848 (2006). 
104. Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(quoting Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)). 
105. See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986). 
106.  Kurtz, The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, supra note 50, at 114. 
107. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(quoting See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
108. Kurtz, The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, supra note 50, at 83−84. 
109. Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1988). 
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copyright protection, no expression may be copyrighted if so doing 
would enable one to appropriate an idea.110 Underpinning the idea-
expression dichotomy, as well as the merger doctrine, is the objective of 
keeping productivity-enabling ideas in the public domain.111 In tandem, 
providing incentives to create particularized expressions while 
maintaining the free availability of the intellectual infrastructure needed 
to create them ensures that copyright operates as “the engine of free 
expression.”112 
Similar productivity-enhancing concerns apply to the scenes a faire 
doctrine, which dynamically relegates expressions to the public domain 
as society comes to perceive them as stock or standard. Maintaining 
these expressive building blocks in the public domain allows authors to 
freely appropriate them when creating new stories. Moving beyond the 
literary realm, courts in software cases have recognized the scenes a 
faire doctrine’s productivity-enhancing character.113 In analyzing 
computer programs, the Second Circuit has invoked the scenes a faire 
doctrine to ensure that “non-protectable technical expression remains in 
the public domain for others to use freely as building blocks in their own 
work.”114 
It is important to note other copyright doctrines that can liberalize 
access to protected material, thus enhancing its productive downstream 
exploitation.115 The fair use defense exempts qualified uses of 
copyrighted material from infringement, such as for news reporting, 
teaching, or parody.116 Additionally, in certain cases courts have relaxed 
exclusive rights on copyrighted material by protecting it with a liability 
                                                     
110. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir. 1967) (holding that 
copyright does not inhere in the written rules of a sweepstakes contest because such expression is 
inseparable from the idea of the contest itself); Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 489. For a discussion of 
merger in the computer science context, see Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 
F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983). 
111. While licensing could theoretically enable many downstream elaborations of a copyrighted 
idea, high transaction costs, bounded rationality, and imperfect information prevent optimal 
licensing. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, at 278. 
112. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
113. Again, not all circuits have adopted identical approaches to the scenes a faire doctrine in the 
context of computer works. See Murray, supra note 103. 
114. Computer Assocs., Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 721 (2d Cir. 1992). 
115. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, at 286–90. 
116. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 
(1994); Harper & Rowe, Publishers, 471 U.S. 539; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).  
02_LEE_FINAL.DOC 3/14/2008 1:41:54 PM 
The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure 
63 
rather than a property rule.117 This has occurred most prominently in the 
context of derivative works, where a court will allow the author of an 
unauthorized derivative work to continue to promulgate it as long as he 
provides compensation to the underlying copyright owner.118 As we will 
see, liability rules (including fair use, which one can liken to a zero-price 
liability rule) can play a very helpful role in allowing downstream users 
to access upstream protected material.119  
However, liability rules as traditionally applied in the copyright 
context focus on liberalizing access to particular texts that may not 
necessarily be widely needed by the creative community as a whole. A 
court’s decision to allow continued distribution of an unauthorized 
derivative work contingent on paying an ongoing royalty may be based 
more on a sense of doing justice between two disputing parties rather 
than because the underlying copyrighted work is truly infrastructural. On 
the contrary, the idea-expression dichotomy and the scenes a faire 
doctrine are more centrally “infrastructural” in their orientation because 
they liberalize access to general building blocks of creation, such as 
ideas and stock expressions. 
As with genericide, concerns over productivity losses from 
intellectual monopolies inform the idea-expression dichotomy and the 
scenes a faire doctrine. Exclusive rights over abstract ideas, which 
seldom have adequate substitutes, cast a very long shadow.120 The idea-
expression dichotomy directly prohibits exclusive rights on ideas; the 
merger doctrine indirectly prevents such appropriation by denying 
copyright protection where idea and expression have merged. Similarly, 
the scenes a faire doctrine preserves stock or standard expressions in the 
                                                     
117. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10 (“[T]he goals of the copyright law, ‘to stimulate 
the creation and publication of edifying matter,’ are not always best served by automatically 
granting injunctive relief when parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds of fair use.”) 
(quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1134 (1990)); 
Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543–47 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006), in a copyright case); New 
Era Publ’ns Int’l, APS v. Henry Holt, Co., 884 F. 2d 659, 663 (2d Cir. 1989) (Newman, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (rejecting the contention that once copyright 
infringement is found, an injunction follows as a matter of course); Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 
1465, 1478–80 (9th Cir. 1988); Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair 
Use?, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 513, 525–30 (1999) (proposing eliminating fair use and injunctive 
relief in favor of fee-based liability rules); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1130–35 (1990). 
118. See Abend, 863 F.2d at 1478–80. 
119. See infra Part IV. 
120. See Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost, supra note 97, at 1253−58. 
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public domain “because to hold otherwise would give the first author a 
monopoly on the commonplace ideas behind the scenes a faire.”121 Open 
access to creative infrastructure facilitates downstream productivity 
while reserving exclusive rights only for literary “applications” 
maintains incentives to create.122 
3. Patents: The Prohibition Against Patenting Natural Laws, Physical 
Phenomena, and Abstract Ideas 
As with trademark and copyright law, patent law also distinguishes 
between intellectual infrastructure and application. Like the idea-
expression dichotomy, patent law prohibits exclusive rights on certain 
“raw” ingredients of creation—natural laws, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas—and reserves patents only for specific inventions. As 
with its intellectual property siblings, this differential treatment of 
infrastructure and application helps patent law achieve its utilitarian 
objectives. As I will later show, however, patent law has a static 
conception of nonprotectable intellectual infrastructure and does not 
accommodate the reality that certain patented inventions can become 
infrastructure within their term of protection.123 
Natural laws, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas may not be 
patented. The Patent Act defines patentable subject matter as “any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof,” but does not define that 
which is not patentable.124 Subject matter exclusions thus arise from case 
law125 and have been deeply influenced by the legislative history of the 
1952 Patent Act, which expressed Congress’s intent that patentable 
inventions “may include anything under the sun that is made by man.”126 
                                                     
121. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1984). 
122. Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 813 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Only by vigorously policing the line 
between idea and expression can we ensure both that artists receive due reward for their original 
creations and that proper latitude is granted other artists to make use of ideas that properly belong to 
us all.”). 
123. See infra Part III.C. 
124. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining patentable subject matter) with 17 U.S.C. § 
102(b) (2000) (enumerating exclusions from copyrightable subject matter). 
125. For a more thorough history, see Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery, supra note 
10, at 92−98. 
126. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399. 
02_LEE_FINAL.DOC 3/14/2008 1:41:54 PM 
The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure 
65 
However, as the Supreme Court held in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 127 this 
expansive language does not  
suggest that § 101 [of the Patent Act] has no limits or that it 
embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable. 
Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant 
found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, 
Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor 
could Newton have patented the law of gravity.128 
This nonpatentable subject matter—natural laws, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas—comprises intellectual infrastructure. 
These entities are: (1) nonrival,129 (2) valuable as enablers of subsequent 
inventions, and (3) inputs into a wide range of applications.130 
Accordingly, open access to this inventive infrastructure enhances 
downstream productivity. 
A distinction between productivity-enabling infrastructure that resides 
in the public domain and refined, particularized inventions that are 
eligible for exclusive rights runs throughout patentable subject matter 
jurisprudence. On the infrastructure side, the Second Circuit has 
famously held that “[e]poch-making ‘discoveries’ of ‘mere’ general 
scientific ‘laws,’ without more, cannot be patented.”131 Additionally, in 
computer sciences cases,132 courts have struck down patents claiming 
algorithms as improperly attempting to claim abstract ideas.133 
Distinguishing between infrastructure and application, the Supreme 
Court has rejected a patent claiming a combination of various nitrogen-
fixing bacteria, explaining that “[h]e who discovers a hitherto unknown 
phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law 
recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must 
                                                     
127. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
128. Id. at 309 (citations omitted). 
129. Physical phenomena, such as all the members of an endangered species, are scarce and 
therefore rivalrous. However, any patent claiming physical phenomena does not claim the physical 
manifestations of these entities, but somewhat abstracted blueprints of them, which are nonrival. 
130. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 956. 
131. Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961, 961 (2d Cir. 1944). 
132. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software 
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7−13 (2001). 
133. Cf. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. (87 U.S.) 498, 507 (1874) (holding that 
abstract ideas are not patentable); see also Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 155 (1852) (upholding a 
patent on a process for manufacturing lead pipes, but refusing to construe the patent as covering the 
principle of manufacturing such pipes). 
02_LEE_FINAL.DOC 3/14/2008 1:41:54 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 83:39, 2008 
66 
come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful 
end.”134 While sufficient human manipulation of a natural substance may 
yield a patentable invention,135 the underlying substance in its natural 
state is not patentable. Analogously, while an abstract algorithm cannot 
be patented,136 applying that algorithm in the context of a broader 
process or machine may produce a patentable invention.137 
Maintaining intellectual infrastructure in the public domain promotes 
inventive activity.138 In Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,139 
the Supreme Court explicitly invoked the language of infrastructure 
when it stated, “[t]he qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, 
electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of 
knowledge of all men.”140 Similarly, in Gottschalk v. Benson,141 the 
Court recognized that “[p]henomena of nature . . . mental processes, and 
abstract intellectual concepts are . . . the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.”142 These metaphors of storehouses and tools reflect 
the principle of intellectual infrastructure, which is made widely 
available to the public at large to facilitate downstream productivity.143 
As with trademark and copyright, concerns over productivity losses 
from intellectual monopolies have motivated courts in patent cases to 
preserve infrastructure in the public domain.144 The Funk Bros. Court 
explicitly warned against monopolizing nature’s “storehouse of 
                                                     
134. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (emphasis added). 
135. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (upholding a patent on extracted, purified 
adrenaline). 
136. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 
584, 594–95 (1978). 
137. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981) (upholding a patent on a process for curing 
rubber that employs the Arrhenius equation). 
138. For additional rationales behind these exclusions, see Eileen M. Kane, Patent Ineligibility: 
Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 519, 545−46 (2006). 
139. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).  
140. Id. at 130. 
141. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
142. Id. at 67. 
143. See Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery, supra note 10, at 108−09. 
144. Courts frequently employ the term “monopoly” in a manner different from the strict 
economic meaning of the term, which involves exercising market power. In most cases, sufficient 
substitutes for patented products exist to prevent a monopoly. However, because natural laws, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas lack substitutes, granting patents on such resources would 
likely confer market power on the patentee, thus facilitating a monopoly. 
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knowledge.”145 Brenner v. Manson,146 a case focusing on the statutory 
requirement that patentable inventions must be useful147 rather than on 
patentable subject matter per se, is also illustrative in this regard. There, 
the Supreme Court denied a patent on a process for creating chemical 
compounds of no known utility but which might be useful in subsequent 
research.148 The Court explained that the “metes and bounds of that 
monopoly are not capable of precise delineation . . . . Such a patent may 
confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development, without 
compensating benefit to the public.”149 Similar concerns counsel against 
allowing strong exclusive rights on intellectual infrastructure. 
In 2006, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari in 
Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories 
Inc.150 This left undisturbed a Federal Circuit decision upholding a 
patent on a process for diagnosing vitamin deficiencies from elevated 
levels of homocysteine in the human body.151 Many commentators had 
viewed this case as a valuable opportunity to clarify the patentability of 
natural principles and ideas. In his dissent from the dismissal of the writ 
of certiorari, Justice Breyer noted that “sometimes too much patent 
protection can impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.’”152 This observation highlights the functional concern 
driving the exclusion of natural laws, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas from patentability.153 Preserving this infrastructure in the public 
domain facilitates downstream invention and ultimately advances the 
utilitarian objectives of the patent system.154 
                                                     
145. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130. 
146. 383 U.S. 519 (1966).  
147. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
148. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 532. 
149. Id. at 534. 
150. 548 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (per curiam). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 2922 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari) (citation omitted). 
153. Justice Breyer’s concerns over patenting “upstream” discoveries are consistent with broader 
critiques of exclusive rights in research science. See ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 275 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973); 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 
YALE L.J. 177, 180–95 (1987). But see Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the 
Commons: The Case of Scientific Research, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, Summer 1996, at 145, 150 (noting 
that informal sharing norms continue against a backdrop of formal patent rights) [hereinafter 
Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons]. 
154. But see R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to be Free: Intellectual Property and the 
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 995 (2003). Professor Wagner argues that 
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Although patent and copyright law are more similar to each other than 
to trademark law, these fields are all bound by a utilitarian focus on 
promoting productivity. Furthermore, they achieve this end through a 
shared means: preserving open access to infrastructure and extending 
protection only to refined, particularized applications.155 Maintaining 
infrastructure such as generic words, ideas, and natural principles in the 
public domain advances commercial, creative, and inventive activity.  
This doctrinal tour has revealed that infrastructure plays a functional 
role in advancing intellectual property’s utilitarian aims. Infrastructure, 
however, is not a static entity. More precisely, what constitutes 
“infrastructure” evolves as society comes to rely on new and different 
resources as critical for enabling downstream productivity. This raises 
the question of whether legal doctrines designed to enhance access to 
infrastructure accommodate this evolution, a question we will consider 
next. 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
REAL PROPERTY LAW’S RESPONSE: RECLASSIFYING 
PROPERTY FROM “PRIVATE” TO “PUBLIC” TO ENHANCE 
ACCESS AND PRODUCTIVITY 
An examination of real property law reveals that social conceptions of 
infrastructure evolve and, more importantly, that legal doctrines respond 
to this evolution by relaxing exclusive rights on resources that become 
infrastructure. This examination reveals several key insights for 
understanding intellectual infrastructure. First, concerns over promoting 
productivity lead real property doctrines to ensure wide access to certain 
                                                     
“information wants to be free,” and that increased copyrighting and patenting will inevitably enrich 
the public domain because every creation provides “derivative” information about itself that cannot 
be captured. Id. at 1002−07. Examples of this derivative information include abstract ideas, 
scientific principles, and settings of creative works. Id. at 1007. Crucially, these assets largely 
correlate with elements that genericity, the idea-expression dichotomy, the scenes a faire doctrine, 
and exclusions from patentable subject matter are intended to preserve in the public domain. 
Propertization of these assets would undermine the supposed benefit of derivative information, thus 
corroborating concerns that expansive intellectual property rights are impoverishing the public 
domain. 
155. These doctrines share another interesting similarity: they all deal with abstraction. Judge 
Hand explicitly defined ideas as more abstract than expressions. Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). Similarly, generic trademarks are abstractions—they signify 
an entire class of products instead of a particularized member of that class. Analogously, an 
invention, if subjected to a “great number of patterns of increasing generality,” could be 
conceptualized as a combination of scientific principles and mechanical forces. Id. At this level of 
abstraction, exclusive rights are prohibited. 
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“enabling” resources in a manner analogous to intellectual property’s 
open access approach to intellectual infrastructure. Second, resources 
can evolve into infrastructure based on widespread social use and 
adoption. For example, the public’s continued use of an open field for 
communal events can confer on that space an infrastructural quality. I 
call this phenomenon the “evolution of infrastructure.” 
Finally, and most importantly, real property law doctrines respond to 
this evolution by relaxing (and in some cases eliminating) exclusive 
rights on resources that have become infrastructure. Thus, the public’s 
continual use of an open field can mature into a legally recognized right 
of access that is enforceable against the landowner. Within this view, 
related to the “social relations” school of property scholarship,156 
property emerges not as a fixed set of entitlements, but as a dynamic 
entity that accommodates evolving reliance interests.157 In this Part, I 
focus on Professor Carol Rose’s work on inherently public property as 
particularly helpful for understanding the social evolution of 
infrastructure and how property law responds by relaxing exclusive 
rights over such assets. 
 
A. Using Real Property Doctrine to Understand Intellectual 
Infrastructure 
 
First, real property law recognizes the utilitarian value of ensuring 
broad access to infrastructure. Rose’s examination of real property 
corroborates the key insight from infrastructure theory that nonrival, 
productivity-enabling resources are well-suited for open access. 
Responding to law and economics scholarship generally favoring private 
property, Rose explores the peculiar phenomenon of “inherently public 
property.”158 This class of property includes resources that are generally 
ineligible for exclusive rights such as roads, waterways, and even open 
spaces for communal events.159 Although Rose does not frame her 
inquiries into inherently public property in infrastructural terms and 
although the two categories are not coextensive, they do exhibit 
significant overlap. Roads, waterways, and communal gathering 
                                                     
156. See Singer, The Reliance Interest, supra note 22, at 663; JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, 
PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES xxxix-l (4th ed. 2006). 
157.  Cf. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 777–81. 
158. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 712−17. 
159. See id. 
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spaces160 are: (1) at least partially nonrival (subject to capacity and 
congestion), (2) enablers of productive ends, and (3) means to a wide 
variety of ends.161 Furthermore, like infrastructure, inherently public 
property exhibits increasing returns to scale.162 Roads, waterways, and 
fields for public dances reflect a “comedy of the commons,”163 rather 
than the traditional “tragedy of the commons” associated with communal 
ownership.164 For these assets, “the more the merrier”: the larger the 
number of dancers in a public field, the more fun is enjoyed by all.165 
Accordingly, “ownership” by the disorganized public at large is the ideal 
regime for generating the significant positive externalities associated 
with inherently public property.166 The same is true for certain types of 
infrastructure, including intellectual infrastructure such as words, ideas, 
and natural principles.167 
Rose’s later study of Roman roads even more explicitly relates 
inherently public property to infrastructure.168 Rose’s typology of 
                                                     
160. See id. at 717–18, 758−61. 
161. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 956–57. 
162. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 768−70; see Frischmann, Economic 
Theory, supra note 15, at 928. Some inherently public property, such as roads and grazing fields, are 
rivalrous and thus may appear to exhibit diminishing returns to scale. However, Rose situates these 
resources within the context of a broader activity—commerce—that exhibits increasing returns to 
scale. Rose, supra note 28, at 768−69. 
163. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 767–68. 
164. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
165. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 768. 
166. See id. at 721. 
167. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 927–28. Cf. Landsberg v. Scrabble 
Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing a “strong policy 
permitting all to use freely the ideas contained in a copyrighted work so long as copyrighted 
expression is not appropriated”). 
168.  Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in 
the Information Age, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 100–01 (2003) (describing Roman roads as 
infrastructure and comparing them to the Internet) [hereinafter Rose, Romans]. See also Brett 
Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet Infrastructure: Rethinking Market 
Intervention into Government and Government Intervention into the Market, 2 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 1, 30–46 (2001). Rose’s study of Roman roads also relates to contemporary 
commons-based peer production, which is characterized by decentralized networks of individuals 
utilizing commonly accessible resources to contribute to a value creating program. See Yochai 
Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 378–79, 415–
22, 436–38 (2002). Peer production, illustrated in the development of the Linux operation system, 
relies on a commons and challenges the superiority of linear production models where a single 
entity controls access to resources and coordinates the activities of workers. See id. at 425–26, 440–
41, 443, 445. As with Linux, intellectual infrastructure—generic words, ideas, and natural 
principles—is also open source, thus enabling its most productive exploitation by the “disorganized 
public” at large. 
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nonexclusive property in ancient Rome includes “res publicae”: 
resources open and belonging to the public by operation of law such as 
roads, bridge, and rivers.169 One “especially critical factor” justifying 
open access to these assets is that their broad exploitation gives rise to 
“wide-ranging synergies, or what are now called network effects.”170 
Similarly, generic words, ideas, and natural principles generate positive 
externalities and exhibit what can be called infrastructure effects.171 
As with intellectual infrastructure, individual ownership of roads, 
waterways, and communal gathering spaces may enable monopolies that 
hold up socially productive activity.172 The general absence of adequate 
alternatives to these resources renders exclusive rights over them 
particularly damaging.173 To mitigate the excesses of individual 
exclusive rights, various mechanisms have developed to transform, in 
whole or in part, the legal classification of these assets from private to 
                                                     
169. Rose, Romans, supra note 168, at 96−100. 
170. Id. at 97. Network effects arise when a resource’s value increases as more people use it—
such as when a person’s purchase of a telephone enhances the value of the entire network. 
171. Frischmann distinguishes between network effects and infrastructure effects. Network 
effects are likely to be appropriable by owners of the network, who will be willing to pay a higher 
price for network access because of them. Infrastructure effects, by comparison, involve more far-
ranging externalities (often involving public goods) that are not fully appropriable by those using 
the infrastructure. As such, infrastructure effects will not necessarily increase users’ willingness to 
pay for access to infrastructure. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 972−74. 
172. Rose does not address licensing, which could theoretically allow access to an infrastructural 
resource while still maintaining an individual’s ownership rights. However, licensing to all 
prospective users of inherently public property is generally not feasible and provides too unstable a 
basis for securing public access. Preventing holdouts requires actually changing the legal 
characterization of property (or at least establishing access rights to use that property). 
173. In this regard, it is worthwhile to observe that both physical and intellectual infrastructure 
have arisen through a complex combination of private and public initiatives. In the nineteenth 
century, private companies largely financed railroads, though they received significant federal 
assistance through land grants and easements. See generally C. Knick Harley, Oligopoly Agreement 
and the Timing of American Railroad Construction, 42 J. ECON. HIST. 797 (1982). Also in the 
nineteenth century, states constructed canals, such as the Eerie Canal in New York. The U.S. radio 
broadcasting industry “represents a peculiar combination of competitive private enterprise and 
government franchise.” Huseyin Leblebici et al., Institutional Change and the Transformation of 
Interorganizational Fields: An Organizational History of the U.S. Radio Broadcasting Industry, 36 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 333, 334 (1991). Furthermore, the Internet has its roots in the Defense Department’s 
ARPANET. Judy E. O’Neill, The Role of ARPA in the Development of ARPANET, 1961−1972, 17 
IEEE HISTORY OF THE ANNALS OF COMPUTING 76, 76–81 (1995). In comparison, intellectual 
infrastructure also owes its origins to both public and private sources. While individuals and firms 
are the primary sources of new words (including trademarks that become generic) and literary ideas, 
basic scientific research is heavily subsidized by the federal government and conducted in 
significant part by scientists at public and non-profit universities and research institutions. 
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public, such as eminent domain,174 public prescription, the public trust 
doctrine, and perhaps most relevant for our purposes, custom.175 
Second, resources can become infrastructure based on widespread 
social use and reliance. This dynamic view of infrastructure arises, 
counterintuitively, from Rose’s concept of “inherently” public property. 
Ex ante, the open field that Rose describes is private property;176 it only 
becomes inherently public property, ex post, upon a community’s 
continued reliance on it for social events. Similarly, among the infinite 
number of potential paths within a stretch of land, the only one that 
becomes infrastructure is the one that people actually use as a road. The 
wide-ranging synergies and network effects that characterize Roman 
roads as infrastructure are incidents of use. Rose’s work demonstrates 
that an asset may become infrastructure through society’s widespread 
use and dependence on it as an enabler of downstream productivity. 
Third, and most critically, real property law responds to patterns of 
social use by eliminating or relaxing exclusive rights on assets that 
society has come to rely on as infrastructural. Legal classifications of 
property are sensitive to evolving social practice and cultural norms. 
Thus, a community’s reliance on a thoroughfare that runs through 
private property may lead the government to condemn that property to 
build a highway. Through the doctrine of public easements, the public’s 
repeated trespass on private land can ripen into a right of use that is 
permanent and hostile to the property owner.177 The responsiveness of 
legal classifications of infrastructure is also apparent in the public trust 
doctrine, which, among other functions, has traditionally provided open 
access to communal areas such as the foreshore of beaches.178 Courts 
have extended this doctrine to include the sandy beach area adjacent to 
the foreshore to facilitate activities such as sunbathing that earlier 
generations did not regard as important.179 Similarly, with the emergence 
                                                     
174. Underscoring the importance of eminent domain as a means for allowing public interests to 
trump individual property rights, Contracts Clause doctrine prohibits legislatures from contracting 
away their eminent domain power. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of 
Contracts and the Contracts Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 647, 690−91 (1988). 
175. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 749−50. Although it stands on 
uncertain legal ground, the essential facilities doctrine in antitrust may also fit within this paradigm. 
See Frischmann & Waller, supra note 76, at 45–46. 
176. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 750−51. 
177. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 699−701 (6th ed. 2006). 
178. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Assoc., 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
179. Id. at 369. 
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of air travel, Congress passed the Air Commerce Act of 1926,180 
establishing a right of public transit over navigable airspace and 
abrogating the common law ad coelum rule that a landowner’s right to 
exclude extends to the heavens.181 In all of these cases, property law 
relaxes individual exclusive rights to accommodate evolving 
conceptions of what constitutes infrastructure. 
Custom is particularly relevant to illustrating how social practice can 
create legal rights to access private property that has become 
infrastructure. Rose describes how the custom of holding communal 
dances on a particular plot of land can transform that land into 
“inherently” public property.182 Reliance interests established by the 
public, which may have been arbitrary in their initial location, 
nevertheless trump the seemingly legitimate interests of the landowner. 
Rose notes, “[t]hus the location of customary public activities may 
matter a great deal, not because it would be impossible to conduct these 
activities elsewhere, but because to relocate would rupture the continuity 
of the community’s experience and diminish the significance of the 
activity itself.”183 Rose goes on to observe that “habit, expectation, 
custom, perhaps tied to a variety of community practices, may make 
property hostage to private ‘holdout’ power. The public’s custom of 
dancing and carousing in a particular place, like its habit of traveling on 
certain paths, makes these various lands essential.”184 Widespread social 
use and reliance can imbue resources with infrastructural qualities, and 
property law often responds by widening public access to those 
resources.185  
Property law’s responsiveness to changing notions of what constitutes 
infrastructure highlights the dynamic interaction of law and norms. Early 
scholarship on communal norms emphasized the role of norms and non-
state actors in resolving disputes and managing communal resources 
without recourse to formal legal rules.186 However, the legal doctrines 
                                                     
180. See An Act To Encourage and Regulate the Use of Aircraft in Commerce, and for Other 
Purposes, Pub. L. No. 69-254, §6, 44 Stat. 568 (1926), repealed by Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1401(a), 
72 Stat. 731, 806 (1958). 
181. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 13−15 
(2007); Hinman v. Pac. Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936). 
182. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 758−61. 
183. Id. at 759. 
184. Id. at 760 (emphasis added). 
185. See Singer, The Reliance Interest, supra note 25, at 665–77. 
186. See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); ELINOR OSTROM, 
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mediating inherently public property reveal that cultural norms and 
social practice can themselves become incorporated in legal rules. This 
Article extends these real property considerations to show that resources 
can “become” infrastructure in the intellectual property realm as well, 
and that intellectual property law should similarly accommodate that 
evolution by changing the legal status of these resources to enhance their 
availability. 
Infrastructure evolves, both in its social definition and legal 
classification. As a community comes to rely on a productivity-enabling 
resource such as a road or waterway, that resource may attain 
infrastructural status. In certain cases, real property law responds to this 
emerging reliance by granting public access rights to otherwise private 
property.187  Similarly, intellectual infrastructure also evolves. Language 
shifts as people use trademarked terms as generic words. The set of 
“stock” elements necessary to tell communally recognizable stories 
changes over time. And the basic suite of infrastructural assets necessary 
to invent in a given field shifts as technology progresses. If infrastructure 
is both socially defined and warrants legal treatment different from other 
types of property, then the legal designation of infrastructure should 
change along with changing social notions of what constitutes 
infrastructure.188 The question remains as to how well trademark, 
copyright, and patent law doctrines designed to enhance access to 
intellectual infrastructure accommodate this evolution. 
III.  ACCOMMODATING THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLECTUAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
As we have seen, intellectual property law promotes productivity by 
applying the opposing property regimes of open access and exclusive 
rights to intellectual infrastructure and application, respectively. 
Maintaining liberal access to infrastructure is critical to downstream 
productivity. Infrastructure, however, is a moving target. Widespread 
                                                     
GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990). For an overview of law-and-norms theory, see Arti Kaur Rai, 
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. 
L. REV. 77, 81−88 (1999).  
187.  Cf. Singer, The Reliance Interest, supra note 25, at 673–77. 
188. There are, of course, a number of ways to accomplish this goal. I will explore doctrines in 
trademark and copyright that relegate assets that become infrastructure to the public domain on a 
case-by-case basis. Patent law’s relatively short term of twenty years represents another way to 
ensure timely public access to infrastructure. However, for reasons I discuss in Part III.D.1, this 
mechanism is inadequate. 
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social appropriation and reliance can enable a particularized intellectual 
creation to “evolve” into general infrastructure over which exclusive 
rights may be highly problematic.  
While trademark and copyright law acknowledge and accommodate 
the evolution of intellectual infrastructure, patent law does not. 
Trademark is highly responsive to linguistic evolution, as the doctrine of 
genericide relies on changing consumer perceptions to determine when a 
trademark has become a generic word. Copyright is also sensitive to 
infrastructural evolution, though in a more subtle way. As once-novel 
expressions develop into widely needed creative building blocks, the 
idea-expression dichotomy and scenes a faire doctrine relegate them to 
the public domain where they are freely appropriable. Patent law takes 
the narrowest and most rigid approach to infrastructure. While  
“primary” infrastructure consisting of natural laws, physical phenomena, 
and abstract ideas is not protectable, patent law has no social feedback 
mechanism for relaxing exclusive rights on patented inventions that 
evolve into productivity-enabling infrastructure before expiration of the 
twenty-year patent term.189 This inattentiveness to social reliance 
interests allows exclusive rights on widely needed technological 
infrastructure to persist, thus threatening to inhibit downstream 
productivity. 
A. Trademarks: Sensitivity to Changing Social Practice 
Trademark law engages in a dynamic, socially responsive inquiry to 
distinguish protectable marks from nonprotectable intellectual 
infrastructure. Importantly, trademark law relegates marks to the public 
domain whether they begin as infrastructure or whether they achieve that 
status through social usage. As mentioned, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) 
authorizes cancellation of a registered mark at any time it becomes 
generic.190 Within this framework, the “primary significance of the 
registered mark to the relevant public” at the time the mark is challenged 
(rather than at the time of creation) determines whether the mark is 
legally generic.191 Courts apply genericide in a factually intensive 
                                                     
189. See infra Part III.D.1. 
190. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2000). 
191. Id. This language comes from the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984. As courts have 
noted, this standard adopted the test of genericness articulated in Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 
F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). See Magic Wand, Inc. v. RDB, Inc., 940 F.2d 638, 640 (Fed. Cir. 
1991). 
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manner. In so doing, they draw from social data such as consumer 
surveys, market information, and dictionaries to determine whether a 
trademark has become an infrastructural, generic word and is thus 
inappropriate for exclusive rights.192 This highly contextual inquiry also 
allows courts to distinguish among the perceptions of various 
communities, allowing a mark to remain a protected trademark in 
situations where it has not become generic. Ultimately, this socially 
attentive approach to distinguishing generic linguistic infrastructure 
from protectable linguistic applications helps trademark law advance its 
utilitarian goals. 
The first notable feature of genericide analysis is its high sensitivity to 
evolving consumer perceptions of meaning.193 In the seminal case of 
Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co.,194 the Southern District of New York 
considered Bayer’s claimed trademark on the word “aspirin.”195 
Focusing solely on the factual question of what buyers understood that 
term to mean,196 the court concluded that for lay consumers, “aspirin” 
had entered the vernacular as a generic word.197 As the commonly 
recognized signifier of an entire product class, “aspirin” was susceptible 
to a multitude of linguistic applications beyond Bayer’s product and 
exclusive rights over such a generic term were inappropriate. 
Courts rely on a wide array of social evidence to determine what the 
relevant public actually understands a given trademark to mean.198 For 
example, in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,199 the Supreme Court 
ruled that “shredded wheat” was generic, relying on evidence that 
“[e]ver since 1894 the article has been known to the public as shredded 
wheat.”200 Similarly, in Dixi-Cola Laboratories v. Coca-Cola Co.,201 the 
                                                     
192. See infra text accompanying notes 198−207 
193. Courts have adopted a three-part test within which a party asserting genericide must: (1) 
identify the product class for which the mark is relevant, (2) identify the relevant purchasing 
community for that product, and (3) prove that the primary significance of the trademark is to 
identify the class of products to which the mark relates. Glover v. Ampak, Inc., 74 F.3d 57, 59 (4th 
Cir. 1996). 
194. 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
195. Id. at 509. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 514. 
198. Magic Wand, Inc. v. RDB, Inc., 940 F.2d 638, 641 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see 2 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:13 (4th ed. 2006). 
199. 305 U.S. 111 (1938). 
200. Id. at 117. 
201. 117 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1941). 
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Fourth Circuit rejected Coca-Cola’s claim to a trademark on the word 
“cola,” noting widespread generic use of this term by competitors.202 
More recently, the Fourth Circuit relied on historical usage, consumer 
perception, and publications such as America Online for Dummies in 
concluding that “You Have Mail” was generic.203 In holding that “beef 
stick” and “turkey stick” were generic, one court identified competitors’ 
use, plaintiffs’ use, dictionary definitions, media usage, testimony of 
persons in the trade, and consumer surveys as potential sources of 
evidence of genericity.204 
In many cases, litigants conduct market surveys to determine 
consumer perceptions, as in King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin 
Industries, Inc.205 In ruling that “thermos” was generic, the Second 
Circuit cited one survey indicating that only about twelve percent of the 
American public knew that the word “thermos” had any trademark 
significance.206 The court further noted that by the early 1950s, the 
generic use of “thermos” had grown significantly in non-trade 
publications and that it had become basically synonymous with “vacuum 
insulated container.”207 In all of these cases, social data showed that the 
public had come to understand a term as generic, thus warranting 
relegation of that infrastructural resource to the public domain. 
Within the genericide framework, the trademark holder’s efforts to 
“police” usage of the mark are irrelevant; what matters is actual public 
perception.208 Thus, in Bayer, the plaintiff’s expenditure of “large sums 
of money” in marketing aspirin could not prevent the loss of trademark 
status.209 In an irony at the heart of genericide, Bayer was a victim of its 
own success.210 A typical firm aims to “build brand dominance to the 
point of ubiquity, so that the brand is the first thing on a consumer’s 
mind when considering a purchase of a particular type of good.”211 
However, if the mark becomes the de facto means of signifying the class 
                                                     
202. Id. at 360. 
203. Am. Online, Inc., v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 819−21 (4th Cir. 2001). 
204. Hickory Farms, Inc. v. Snackmasters, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 789, 803 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
205. 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963). 
206. Id. at 579−80. 
207. Id. at 579. 
208. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
209. Bayer Co. v. United Drug, Co., 272 F. 505, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
210. Id. at 512–13. 
211. Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2007). 
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to which the product belongs, the public establishes an easement over 
this infrastructural asset that the firm must accommodate.212 Public 
perception that a mark is infrastructural trumps individual efforts to 
maintain it as a particularized, proprietary application. 
The second notable feature of genericide analysis is its highly 
contextual nature. A mark may be arbitrary for one product but generic 
for another because of differences in use over time, among multiple 
groups, and even among various uses of the same product.213 For 
example, “apple” is generic in the produce industry, but a distinctive 
trademark in the computer industry.214 Accordingly, courts distinguish 
among the perceptions of various consumer communities. In Bayer, the 
court differentiated between chemists, physicians, and druggists, who 
were aware that aspirin was Bayer’s particular product, and lay 
consumers, for whom “aspirin” was generic.215 This difference in 
perception led to a highly tailored remedy. The Bayer court allowed the 
alleged infringer, United Drug, to use “aspirin” in its marketing to the 
general public. However, the court enjoined United Drug from using 
“aspirin” in direct sales to chemists, physicians, and druggists. Because 
of their specialized knowledge, these consumers might be misled if 
United Drug marketed its product under the same name used by 
Bayer.216 
Genericide is explicitly outward looking and engages the reality of 
linguistic evolution. Starting from the premise that generic words are 
intellectual infrastructure and inappropriate for exclusive ownership, the 
doctrine relies on social data such as consumer surveys, market reports, 
sales materials, brochures, and dictionaries to determine whether the 
relevant consuming public understands a mark to be generic. These 
social data may reveal a reality that genericide is designed to make 
legally relevant: once-particularized marks, even those fabricated by 
individual firms, can become the generic mechanisms by which the 
public refers to entire product categories. Although the doctrine is not 
                                                     
212. Even registered marks that have reached “incontestable” status are subject to cancellation if 
they are or become generic. Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985). 
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 establishes causes of actions to protect “famous” and 
distinctive marks from blurring and tarnishment; such protection, of course, does not extend to 
generic marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). 
213. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9, 11. 
214. See Am. Online, Inc., v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 820 (4th Cir. 2001). 
215. Bayer Co., 272 F. at 510. 
216. Id. at 514. 
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immune from criticism,217 genericide’s responsiveness to evolving social 
norms and its ability to facilitate context-specific remedies help it 
achieve the utilitarian goals of the trademark system.218 Exclusive rights 
on generic words may confuse consumers and inhibit competition, and 
genericide addresses this problem in a dynamic, targeted fashion by 
relegating marks to the public domain as they achieve infrastructural 
status. 
B. Copyrights: Enhancing Access to Stock and Standard Expression 
Copyright also accommodates the evolution of intellectual 
infrastructure by liberalizing access to widely used material, though in a 
more subtle manner than trademark. Copyright accommodates evolving 
social practice in two related ways. First, when identifying where an 
element of a work falls on the continuum between idea and expression, 
courts are more likely to attach the label of nonprotectable “idea” to an 
element that is commonly used. Thus, society’s repeated and varied use 
of what could arguably be categorized as an expression will help inch 
that element towards nonprotectability as infrastructure. Second, in a 
more direct fashion, the scenes a faire doctrine transmutes expressions 
that are stock or standard into nonprotectable elements residing in the 
public domain. Through these processes, copyright dynamically 
accommodates the creative community’s need to access intellectual 
infrastructure, even as the definition of what constitutes “infrastructure” 
evolves. 
1.  The Idea-Expression Dichotomy 
The key to recognizing courts’ socially attentive application of the 
idea-expression dichotomy is that “idea” and “expression” are not 
qualitatively different, but represent different ends of the same 
continuum.219 In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,220 Judge Learned 
                                                     
217. See Desai & Rierson, supra note 211, at 1790–92 (arguing that genericism should focus 
more narrowly on a mark’s ability to identify a source in commercial contexts, notwithstanding 
noncommercial uses of the mark). 
218. See Hans Zeisel, The Surveys That Broke Monopoly, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 896, 898 (1983). 
219. While courts differ on the exact application of the idea-expression dichotomy, they generally 
employ it to distinguish between nonprotectable and protectable elements when comparing 
copyrighted and allegedly infringing works for substantial similarity. See Kurtz, Speaking to the 
Ghost, supra note 97, at 1233−34. 
   220. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).  
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Hand offered the “leading judicial effort”221 to differentiate 
nonprotectable idea from protectable expression, concluding that they 
simply represent different levels of abstraction of the same subject 
matter.222 In articulating his “abstractions” test, Judge Hand candidly 
acknowledged that any line between idea and expression is inherently 
arbitrary.223 Other courts have also recognized that the distinction 
between idea and expression is “elusive”224 and “faint.”225 Not 
surprisingly, scholars have criticized the arbitrary nature of the idea-
expression dichotomy, calling it “[t]he most notorious problem in 
copyright law.”226 
The absence of an objective framework for distinguishing a work’s 
ideas and expressions leaves open the question of how, exactly, courts 
make these determinations. It is here that the connection between the 
idea-expression dichotomy and copyright’s accommodation of evolving 
intellectual infrastructure becomes apparent. Specifically, in the absence 
of a priori definitions of “idea” and “expression,” courts apply the idea-
expression dichotomy in a functional manner to best promote creative 
productivity. Along the continuum between idea and expression, 
application of the idea-expression dichotomy is a policy judgment, 
similar to determining proximate cause in tort cases.227 Courts calibrate 
                                                     
221. Wiley, supra note 22, at 122. 
222. In comparing a play and an allegedly infringing movie, Judge Hand stated: 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality 
will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no 
more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only 
of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, 
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their 
expression, his property is never extended. 
45 F.2d at 121. 
223. Id. at 122 (“[W]hile we are as aware as any one that the line, wherever it is drawn, will seem 
arbitrary, that is no excuse for not drawing it.”); see Nash v. CBS, 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 
1990) (noting that Judge Hand’s test is “not a ‘test’ at all. It is a clever way to pose the difficulties 
that . . . does little to help resolve a given case . . . .”). 
224. Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 587−88 (2d Cir. 1996). 
225. Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 2003). 
226. Wiley, supra note 22, at 121; see Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost, supra note 97, at 1222; 
Kurtz, The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, supra note 50, at 85 (characterizing the idea-expression 
dichotomy as subjective and ad hoc); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective of the 
Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel,” 38 EMORY L.J. 
393, 403 (1989); see also Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-
Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175, 178 
(1990) (arguing that judges’ subjective estimations of artistic merit shade their application of the 
idea-expression dichotomy). 
227. A continuum also exists in trademark, where some terms are universally perceived as 
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where an element of a creative work falls along this continuum to strike 
the best balance between granting exclusive rights and preserving a 
robust public domain. While vulnerable to criticisms of subjectivity, this 
approach allows courts to preserve as nonprotectable certain elements 
that society, through widespread use and reliance, has come to regard as 
infrastructural. 
In some cases, a court’s functional application of the idea-expression 
dichotomy is explicit. In Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. 
Kalpakian,228 the Ninth Circuit considered the alleged copying of a 
jewel-encrusted bee pin.229 The court noted that the “guiding 
consideration in drawing the line [between idea and expression] is the 
preservation of the balance between competition and protection reflected 
in the patent and copyright laws.”230 Thus, the court recognized that 
functional aims explicitly define idea versus expression. Herbert 
Rosenthal is remarkably candid: “We think the production of jeweled 
bee pins is a larger private preserve than Congress intended to be set 
aside in the public market without a patent. A jeweled bee pin is 
therefore an ‘idea’ that defendants were free to copy.”231 Here, the cart 
clearly comes before the horse. Jewel-encrusted bee pins do not satisfy 
some objective definition of “idea.” Rather, they are ideas because 
treating them as such promotes creative productivity. This is a strictly 
functional, rather than formal, definition of idea.232 
When locating an element of a creative work on the continuum 
between idea and expression, courts are more likely to construe 
commonplace elements of creative works as “ideas.” While this appears 
intuitive, upon further reflection it becomes clear that just because 
something is common does not make it an idea. However, equating 
                                                     
source-identifying marks, others are universally perceived as generic, and a middle range exists 
where marks may be generic in some contexts and not in others. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. 
Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 
1223, 1243–44 (2007). 
228. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971). 
229. Id.  
230. Id. at 742. 
231. Id. (emphasis added). 
232. See also Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 
1986) (“[P]recisely because the line between idea and expression is elusive, we must pay particular 
attention to the pragmatic considerations that underlie the distinction and copyright law generally. 
In this regard, we must remember that the purpose of the copyright law is to create the most 
efficient and productive balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information, to 
promote learning, culture, and development.”) (emphasis added). 
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commonplace elements with nonprotectable “ideas” is fully consistent 
with copyright’s aim of maintaining open access to widely needed 
building blocks of creation. 
Thus, in Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway International, Inc.,233 the 
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling of noninfringement 
regarding two action figures exhibiting a similar crouching stance.234 
Crucially, the court held that the plaintiff’s figures displayed an 
“unprotectable idea—a superhuman muscleman crouching in what since 
Neanderthal times has been a traditional fighting pose.”235 The court did 
not find that the fighting crouch was a once-copyrightable expression 
whose term had expired. Instead, the court found that the crouch was an 
idea itself. While, analytically, one could just as easily categorize the 
crouch as an expression, the fact that society has used this depiction 
repeatedly in a variety of contexts contributed to the conclusion that it 
was a nonprotectable “idea” that should be freely appropriable. 
Other cases further illustrate this equation of “standard” or 
“commonplace” elements with nonprotectable ideas. In Quaker Oats Co. 
v. Mel Appel Enterprises,236 the Southern District of New York 
compared two stuffed toy dogs for substantial similarity.237 In response 
to the defendant’s arguments that any similarities between the two dolls 
arose from nonprotectable ideas, the court noted that the plaintiff’s doll 
was not “standard,” and therefore that the similarities arose from 
protected expression.238 Similarly, in Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Genie 
Toys, Inc.,239 the court rejected the defendant’s argument that a dog in a 
train engineer’s uniform represented a nonprotectable idea.240 The court 
noted that “[w]hile such a phenomenon might exist, it is hardly so 
common as to require the conclusion that this combination is common or 
somehow in the public domain.”241 
                                                     
233. 724 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1983). 
234. Id. at 361. 
235. Id. at 360. The specific “expression” of the exaggerated musculature in Mattel’s dolls did 
constitute copyrightable material, but this was not substantially similar to the musculature of Azrak-
Hamway’s dolls. Id.  
236. 703 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
237. Id.  
238. Id. at 1060. 
239. 491 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Mo. 1980). 
240. Id. at 528–29. 
241. Id. at 529 (emphasis added). 
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Courts’ equation of commonplace elements with ideas advances 
copyright law’s utilitarian aims. Precisely because some expression has 
become so widely used, it becomes a basic building block freely open to 
the creative community. Adopting the awkward phrasing of the idea-
expression dichotomy, society’s continual use of an expression can 
transform it into a nonprotectable idea. 
2. The Scenes a Faire Doctrine 
The second, more direct mechanism by which copyright law 
accommodates the evolution of intellectual infrastructure is the scenes a 
faire doctrine. This doctrine recognizes that certain “stock” scenes, 
characters, and plot devices necessary to express a type of story are not 
subject to copyright protection.242 As with the unfortunately named idea-
expression dichotomy, the scenes a faire doctrine recognizes a 
continuum that requires greater particularization and unique detail in 
otherwise “stock” elements before those elements will receive 
protection. In applying a higher bar for copyright protection to stock or 
standard elements, the scenes a faire doctrine recognizes that certain 
well-traveled expressions can become basic infrastructure that should be 
generally available in the public domain.243 
For example, in Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc.,244 the Second Circuit 
compared a book and an allegedly infringing movie depicting a 
struggling police precinct in the Bronx.245 The court noted that “[f]oot 
chases and the morale problems of policemen, not to mention the 
familiar figure of the Irish cop, are venerable and often-recurring themes 
of police fiction,” and constitute nonprotectable scenes a faire absent 
some differentiating detail.246 While the police fiction genre is of 
relatively recent vintage, these expressions are already so standard that, 
without some distinguishing features, they are not protectable.247 
                                                     
242. See Kurtz, The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, supra note 50. 
243. Of course, the scenes a faire doctrine does not relax exclusive rights on all types of 
expression that represent cultural infrastructure. See generally Anupam Chander & Madhavi 
Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 
CAL. L. REV. 597 (2007) (arguing for a fair use exception for “fan fiction” that builds upon widely-
known cultural entities such as Star Trek). 
244. 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986). 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 50. 
247. See also Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 409−10 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (finding no copyright in 
elements of a play that were “old” and “well exploited” in numerous other literary works). 
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Labeling these expressions as nonprotectable scenes a faire facilitates 
their unfettered use by authors and helps promote creative 
productivity.248 
The scenes a faire doctrine preserves in the public domain elements 
that are “necessary” for expression, and necessity is defined by social 
practice. In Apple Computer Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,249 the Ninth Circuit 
applied the scenes a faire doctrine to conclude that Apple’s overlapping 
windows graphical user interface was not protectable.250 The court stated 
that only two options existed for displaying multiple windows at the 
same time: a tile system and overlapping windows. The court then 
observed, “[a]s demonstrated by Microsoft’s scenes a faire video, 
overlapping windows have been the clear preference in graphic 
interfaces. Accordingly, protectable substantial similarity cannot be 
based on the mere use of overlapping windows.”251 Although Apple’s 
scheme of overlapping windows was a relatively recent innovation—as 
were all graphical user interfaces at that time—the emergence of 
overlapping windows as the preferred standard bolstered the court’s 
conclusion that this format represented a nonprotectable scene a faire. 
Although not dealing with the scenes a faire doctrine per se, another 
computer software case also reflects copyright law’s aversion to 
allowing exclusive rights on expressions that have become standard 
infrastructure. In Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International,252 
Borland copied the familiar menu command hierarchy from Lotus 1-2-3 
in its competing spreadsheet program.253 The First Circuit held that 
Lotus 1-2-3’s menu command hierarchy was a noncopyrightable method 
of operation and denied Lotus’s infringement claim.254 While the court 
based its holding on the statutory exclusion of methods of operation 
from copyrightable subject matter, considerations of widespread 
                                                     
248. See Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The common use of such 
stock . . . merely reminds us that in Hollywood, as in the life of men generally, there is only rarely 
anything new under the sun.”); see also Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 
F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that expressive elements in the Pac-Man video game such as 
a graphical maze and scoring table are “standard” elements that are not subject to copyright 
protection). 
249. 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994).  
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).  
253. Id. 
254. Id. at 815; 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (excluding “methods of operation” from copyright 
protection). 
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consumer reliance loomed large. The court rejected as “absurd” the 
possibility that users who had familiarized themselves with Lotus 1-2-3 
would have to learn different methods for performing identical functions 
in programs from other manufacturers.255 In his concurring opinion, 
Judge Boudin was even more explicit: “A new menu may be a creative 
work, but over time its importance may come to reside more in the 
investment that has been made by users in learning the menu and in 
building their own mini-programs—macros—in reliance upon the 
menu.”256 While Lotus’s menu has some intrinsic merit, much of its 
value comes from its widespread adoption as a standard that customers 
have invested time and effort to learn.257 Enabling a monopoly over such 
a socially constructed standard could ultimately undermine that 
investment and inhibit productivity.258 
3. Sensitivity to Infrastructural Evolution in Copyright Law 
While action figures and stock characters of police fiction may seem 
like rather trivial subject matter, the manner in which copyright treats 
them reveals an immensely valuable attentiveness to evolving social 
norms. The idea-expression dichotomy and the scenes a faire doctrine 
dynamically relegate elements to the public domain as they become 
infrastructure. Courts apply the idea-expression dichotomy not based on 
a priori definitions of these categories but on policy judgments for 
balancing exclusive rights with a robust public domain. While this 
approach is subject to criticism as arbitrary,259 equating commonplace 
entities with nonprotectable ideas ensures that widely used infrastructure 
remains in the public domain. In a related vein, the scenes a faire 
doctrine “retires” commonly used expressions to the public domain as 
                                                     
255. Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 817−18. 
256. Id. at 819−20 (Boudin, J., concurring). 
257. Some have even argued for copyright law to adopt a genericity doctrine for “arbitrary” 
expressions that become widely used and generic in software programs. See Lee B. Burgunder & 
Carey E. Heckman, An Emerging Theory of Computer Software Genericism, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 229, 
247 (1987); see also Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. 
L. REV. 1329, 1364−67 (1987) (proposing a scheme in which patented, industry standard operating 
systems would be available to users through compulsory licenses). 
258. Interestingly, the trademark doctrine of functionality would also prevent such a “standard” 
graphical user interface from being the subject of exclusive rights as trade dress. See ROBERT 
PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 
627, 714 (4th ed. 2007). 
259. See supra notes 223–226 and accompanying text. 
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they become stock or standard infrastructure.260 Assigning these 
infrastructural units to the public domain allows for their widespread use 
as building blocks for creative expression. 
C. Patents: Insensitivity to the Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure 
Compared with trademark and copyright law, patent law takes the 
narrowest and most rigid approach to recognizing and liberalizing access 
to intellectual infrastructure. Excluding natural laws, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas from patentability serves the functional 
purpose of keeping basic building blocks of productivity in the public 
domain. However, these “raw” assets are not the only basic building 
blocks of invention. Patented technologies themselves can rapidly attain 
infrastructural status as inventive communities come to rely on them as 
enablers of downstream invention. However, patent law has no 
mechanism for liberalizing access to these refined infrastructural assets 
in a timely manner.261 
As with the idea-expression dichotomy, the prohibition against 
patenting natural laws, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas does not 
involve objectively definable categories. As Justice Frankfurter 
remarked in his concurring opinion in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co.: 
It only confuses the issue . . . to introduce such terms as “the 
work of nature” and the “laws of nature.” For these are vague 
and malleable terms infected with too much ambiguity and 
equivocation. Everything that happens may be deemed “the 
work of nature,” and any patentable composite exemplifies in its 
properties “the laws of nature.” Arguments drawn from such 
terms for ascertaining patentability could fairly be employed to 
challenge almost every patent.262 
For both copyright and patent, the difference between ideas and natural 
principles, on the one hand, and particularized expressions and 
inventions, on the other, is one of degree rather than kind.263 
                                                     
260. Cf. Cohen, Creativity and Culture, supra note 35, at 1177 (describing creativity as “an 
emergent property of social and cultural systems, continually shaped by and shaping other social 
changes”). 
261. For an explanation of why the twenty-year patent term is inadequate to provide timely 
access to patented infrastructure, see Part III.D.1. 
262. 333 U.S. 127, 134−35 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
263. Compare id. at 132 (holding that an inoculum combining various bacteria does not constitute 
patentable subject matter), with Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (holding that a 
02_LEE_FINAL.DOC 3/14/2008 1:41:54 PM 
The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure 
87 
Historically, before a series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s, 
courts relied on functional considerations related to advancing progress 
when classifying an invention as protectable or nonprotectable subject 
matter. In this sense, these early courts operated analogously to modern 
copyright courts, which consider macroscopic objectives related to 
promoting progress when characterizing an element of a work as an idea 
or expression. In some cases, creations that may have satisfied some 
formal definition of “invention” were characterized as nonpatentable 
abstract ideas simply because they lacked technical ingenuity264 or an 
immediate, tangible utility.265 Conversely, the extraction and purification 
of a natural substance could render it patentable subject matter merely 
because it became commercially and therapeutically useful.266 As we 
have seen, functional interests in promoting widespread access to a 
given “invention” could contribute to a court’s conclusion that it actually 
comprised a nonpatentable product of nature.267 This was the case in 
Funk. Bros., which sought to preserve natural elements as a “storehouse 
of knowledge.”268 Without objective definitions of what constituted, say, 
a natural phenomenon, courts often drew what they perceived to be the 
appropriate line between nonprotectable and protectable assets to best 
promote technological progress. 
Courts’ ability to apply intellectual infrastructure doctrine in a 
functional manner diminished sharply starting in 1980 with Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty.269 In upholding a patent on a genetically engineered living 
organism, the Supreme Court articulated a remarkably expansive 
conception of patentable subject matter.270 Quoting the legislative 
                                                     
bacterium combining various plasmids does constitute patentable subject matter). 
264. See, e.g., Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874); MERGES & DUFFY, 
supra note 258, at 627. 
265. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71−72 (1972) (“The mathematical formula involved here 
has no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital computer, which means 
that . . . the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be 
a patent on the algorithm itself.”). 
266. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in part 
and rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). 
267. See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text. 
268. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130. 
269. 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980). Other developments, such as the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and the 
creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982, also reflect the generally pro-patent 
character of this period. See Rai, supra note 186, at 94−95. 
270. A. Samuel Oddi, Regeneration in American Patent Law: Statutory Subject Matter, 46 IDEA 
491, 546 (2006) (“[I]t marked a metamorphosis in how the Supreme Court approached patent 
issues—backing away from judicial restraint . . . to adopting an expansive view of the instrumental 
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history of the 1952 Patent Act, the Court noted that “Congress intended 
statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made 
by man.’”271 This broad formulation of patentable subject matter has 
proven very influential.272 By subtraction, it narrowly defines what I 
have been referring to as nonpatentable intellectual infrastructure, which 
the Chakrabarty court identified as “laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas.”273 
A year later in Diamond v. Diehr,274 the Supreme Court further 
constrained expansive interpretations of intellectual infrastructure. In 
that case, the Supreme Court established that courts and the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) should construe patentable subject matter 
formalistically, without regard to the functional merits of an invention.275 
In upholding the patentability of an algorithm-based process for curing 
rubber, the Court emphasized that determinations of patentable subject 
matter should be “wholly apart” from inquiries into other substantive 
criteria of patentability, such as novelty.276 This decision encouraged a 
formalistic examination of whether a claimed invention constituted 
patentable subject matter, divorced from a holistic, contextual evaluation 
of the invention’s potential impact on downstream productivity.277 As 
such, it undermined the flexibility of courts to characterize an invention 
as a natural law, physical phenomenon, or abstract idea when 
productivity considerations counseled against issuing a patent. 
                                                     
goal of the patent system in evolving technologies.”). 
271. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923,  
at 6 (1952)). 
272. See Robert Greene Sterne & Lawrence B. Bugaisky, The Expansion of Statutory Subject 
Matter under the 1952 Patent Act, 37 AKRON L. REV. 217, 218−19 (2004) (“After Chakrabarty, 
reference to statutory subject matter and ‘anything under the sun’ appeared frequently in 
decisions.”). 
273. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. 
274. 450 U.S. 175 (1980).  
275. See id. at 188–91. 
276. Id. at 191 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979)). 
277. A foil to Justice Rehnquist’s formalistic holding is Justice Stevens’s dissent, which explicitly 
considers the burgeoning software industry and the role of patents in its development: 
“Notwithstanding fervent argument that patent protection is essential for the growth of the software 
industry, commentators have noted that ‘this industry is growing by leaps and bounds without it.’” 
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Michael G. Gemignani, Legal Protection 
for Computer Software: The View From ’79, 7 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 269, 270 
(1980)). 
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The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.278 has further expanded patentable 
subject matter; this development concomitantly narrows permissible 
interpretations of nonpatentable intellectual infrastructure. State Street 
minimizes the importance of the statutory categories of process, 
machine, manufacture, and composition of matter, and instead focuses 
on utility as the lynchpin of patentable subject matter.279 While 
considerable tension exists between State Street and Diehr, State Street 
continues a trend reflected in Chakrabarty of continually expanding 
patentable subject matter. 
These decisions establish a narrow, formalistic approach to defining 
intellectual infrastructure. Courts may not consider the macroscopic 
implications of patenting an invention when determining where it falls 
along the continuum from nonpatentable intellectual infrastructure to 
patentable application. While this arguably enhances the analytical rigor 
of the categories comprising intellectual infrastructure (i.e., natural laws, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas), it eliminates much valuable 
flexibility.  
Unlike trademark and copyright law, patent law lacks a mechanism to 
explicitly consider social needs and classify certain inventions as 
intellectual infrastructure to prevent upstream exclusive rights from 
inhibiting downstream productivity. Natural laws, physical phenomena, 
and abstract ideas are not patentable because open access to these kinds 
of intellectual infrastructure enhances productivity. However, certain 
patented technologies themselves, such as gene splicing, polymerase 
chain reaction, isolated and purified human embryonic stem cells, and 
information technology standards, can also attain infrastructural status, 
and do so well before the end of a twenty-year patent term. Similar 
demand-side reasons that counsel for liberalizing access to natural laws, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas apply as well to this refined 
technological infrastructure.  
Existing exceptions permitting unlicensed use of patented 
infrastructure are inadequate. One potential avenue for enhancing access 
to patented infrastructure is the common law experimental use 
exception.280 This doctrine traditionally exempted unauthorized 
                                                     
278. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
279. See id. at 1375. 
280. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600); Sawin v. 
Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391); Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 
1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279); 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS 
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academic, philosophical, and noncommercial uses of patented inventions 
from infringement. In theory, universities and noncommercial 
researchers lacking a license to some foundational patented technology 
could invoke this exception to avoid liability for using that technology in 
an infrastructural manner to pursue basic scientific research.281 In 
particular, this doctrine was potentially helpful for allowing access to 
patented research tools—technological inputs to basic scientific 
research, such as gene fragments.282 However, the Federal Circuit has 
severely narrowed the experimental use exception, virtually eliminating 
this doctrinal “safe harbor” from infringement.283 An existing statutory 
experimental use exception, which allows unlicensed use of patented 
materials for tests related to new drug applications to the Food and Drug 
Administration, is clearly too narrow to facilitate access to a broad array 
of patented infrastructure.284 
The so-called reverse doctrine of equivalents is also inadequate for 
allowing unauthorized users of patented infrastructure to avoid 
infringement.285 This doctrine exempts from infringement inventions 
that literally fall within the claims of a prior patented invention but that 
are significantly different in principle and function from the original.286 
However, this doctrine eliminates liability for radical improvements to 
patented inventions and is thus inapposite when downstream developers 
simply use upstream patented infrastructure as it was originally 
designed. The reverse doctrine of equivalents, which is invoked 
                                                     
FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 898, at 56 (1890). 
281. See generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: 
Do Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921 (2006). 
282. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) defines research tools as “tools that scientists use in 
the laboratory, including cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth factors, 
combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones and cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, 
laboratory equipment and machines.” Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research 
Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final 
Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,092 n.1 (Dec. 23, 1999). 
283. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362−63 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Katherine J. 
Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. 
REV. 81, 84. 
284. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000); see Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, 545 U.S. 193, 205 
n.7 (2005) (declining to categorically exempt from infringement liability the use of research tools 
for submissions to regulatory agencies under the statutory experimental use exception). 
285. See, e.g., Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 571 (1898); see Lemley, 
Economics of Improvement, supra note 22, at 1010−13; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On 
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 862−68 (1990). 
286. See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 22, at 1010−11. 
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extremely rarely, will not shield the overwhelming majority of 
infrastructural uses of patented inventions from infringement liability. 
As a result, the current patent framework is rigidly preoccupied with 
first-order progress dynamics in which exclusive rights encourage 
inventing end-user goods. This is a simple scheme in which patents 
promote progress. However, this framework does not adequately 
consider second-order progress dynamics in which patented technologies 
themselves may become indispensable inputs to downstream production, 
rendering upstream exclusive rights on those foundational technologies 
problematic. Like a trademarked term that has become generic or a 
particularized expression that has become a stock literary device, certain 
inventions can become so widely adopted and relied upon that they 
become basic infrastructure. Restricted access to these infrastructural 
technologies can inhibit technological advances, thus undermining 
scientific progress.287 
D. Reasons for Patent Law’s Rigid Approach to Intellectual 
Infrastructure: Illegitimate Justifications and Legitimate Concerns 
Unlike the dynamic approaches of trademark and copyright law, 
patent law possesses no mechanism for relaxing exclusive rights on 
inventions that evolve into infrastructure during the term of 
protection.288 A continuum emerges wherein trademark law is highly 
responsive to evolving social practice, copyright law implicitly considers 
the “moving target” of what is perceived as stock and standard in 
applying the idea-expression dichotomy and scenes a faire doctrine, and 
patent law takes the narrowest and most rigid approach to identifying 
and enhancing access to intellectual infrastructure. This is particularly 
problematic given that relative to trademark and copyright law, patent 
law exhibits arguably the most accretive model of progress, wherein 
downstream advances depend on access to existing upstream 
technologies. 
Of course, the mere existence of differences is not necessarily cause 
for concern. After all, trademark, copyright, and patent law do vary in 
                                                     
287. See Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 
YALE L.J. 659, 690 (2004) (arguing that early, time-limited access to foundational technologies may 
be the most effective mechanism for sparking scientific paradigm shifts) [hereinafter Lee, Paradigm 
Shifts]. See generally KUHN, supra note 13. 
288. While there is no fixed term of protection for trademarks, a finding of genericide will 
terminate protection. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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their ends and means. This section explores some reasons for patent 
law’s singularity. Drawing on the rapid dynamics of patent-oriented 
industries, it concludes that the relatively short patent term and the 
availability of voluntary licensing are insufficient to justify patent law’s 
rigid insistence on maintaining exclusive rights on patented 
infrastructure. Furthermore, it points out that patent law’s formalistic 
rather than functional approach to identifying infrastructure is due in part 
to the unique timing of this inquiry relative to analogous inquiries in 
trademark and copyright. Finally, it concludes that patent law is different 
from trademark and copyright law in certain respects, and that the need 
to maintain incentives to invent suggests that patent law must liberalize 
access to infrastructure in a manner different from that of its intellectual 
property siblings. 
1. The Inadequacy of the Twenty-Year Patent Term 
Patent law’s only effective mechanism for liberalizing access to 
patented infrastructure is its relatively short term of protection. 
Trademarks last indefinitely, as long as a mark continues to signify an 
individual product or firm.289 This open-ended term of protection, 
coupled with rapid linguistic evolution, renders genericide a valuable 
mechanism for revisiting and cancelling marks that no longer identify 
particular sources. Copyrights last a relatively long time—generally the 
author’s life plus seventy years.290 The idea-expression dichotomy and 
the scenes a faire doctrine operate so that elements that may have been 
protectable expression at one point can become nonprotectable “ideas” 
or scenes a faire upon becoming stock or standard.291 Given these long 
periods of protection, trademark and copyright law utilize dynamic 
doctrines to free up assets as they achieve infrastructural status. 
                                                     
289. See Lanham Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 1059 (2000) (allowing successive ten-year periods of 
registration). For example, Coca-Cola first registered its trademark as early as 1893. See Coca-Cola 
Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
290. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 
2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301−304 (2006)) (extending copyright protection 
an additional twenty years to the author’s life plus seventy years); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of term extension). Currently, the term of 
protection of anonymous, pseudonymous, and institutional authors is the lesser of ninety-five years 
from the date of publication or 120 years from the date of creation. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006). 
291. Such examples are most likely to arise in computer science cases. Cf. Apple Computer v. 
Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that overlapping windows have become 
the clear standard in graphical interfaces and are nonprotectable under the scenes a faire doctrine). 
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In contrast, a patent term lasts only twenty years from the date of 
filing an application.292 Clearly, the relatively short term of a patent 
mitigates concerns over the inaccessibility of patented infrastructure. All 
patented inventions fall into the public domain after twenty years; the 
positive externalities associated with open access to inventions upon 
patent expiration are essential to the basic quid pro quo of the patent 
system.293 However, while the relative brevity of the patent term 
mitigates concerns over locking up infrastructure, it does not extinguish 
them. A one-size-fits-all patent term of twenty years ignores the widely 
divergent contributions of various inventions to subsequent 
technological development and does not account for how quickly certain 
inventions can achieve infrastructural status. 
As seen in numerous examples, patented inventions may become 
infrastructure well before their patents expire, especially in fast-moving 
industries such as biotechnology and information technology. Absent 
efficient licensing, discussed below, exclusive rights on this 
infrastructure may inhibit myriad downstream applications. Here, my 
argument that patent law must better accommodate the evolution of 
intellectual infrastructure intersects with empirical evidence 
demonstrating the need for such accommodation. I thus offer four 
examples of patented inventions that attained infrastructural status well 
before expiration of their patent terms: gene splicing, polymerase chain 
reaction, human embryonic stem cells, and information technology 
standards such as JPEG. 
In 1980, Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer patented the technique for 
gene splicing, the process by which researchers isolate, manipulate, and 
reintroduce DNA into cells.294 The process is the bedrock of 
recombinant DNA technology and facilitates a wide array of 
downstream applications.295 Patent assignee Stanford University 
experimented with several licensing arrangements but generally licensed 
the technology at a low fee of $10,000.296 The broad utility of the 
                                                     
292. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). 
293. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, at 291. 
294. See U.S. Patent No. 4,740,470 (filed Apr. 20, 1984); U.S. Patent No. 4,468,464 (filed Nov. 
9, 1978); U.S. Patent No. 4,237,224 (filed Jan. 4, 1979). 
295. Sally Smith Hughes, Making Dollars out of DNA: The First Major Patent in Biotechnology 
and the Commercialization of Molecular Biology, 1974−1980, 92 ISIS 541, 542 (2001). 
296. See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1857, 1871 (2003); Maryann Feldman et al., Commercializing Cohen-Boyer 1980−1997, 20–
23 (Danish Research Unit for Indus. Dynamics, DRUID Working Paper No. 05-21, 2005). 
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invention coupled with this low license fee led to its widespread 
adoption in the biotechnology sector, and as early as seven years after 
the patent was issued, recombinant DNA product sales reached $500 
million.297 Eleven years after the patent issued, firms were introducing 
400 new products annually based on recombinant gene technology.298 In 
all, 468 companies licensed the gene splicing patent, which generated 
$254 million in licensing revenue over its seventeen-year term.299 Gene 
splicing illustrates the immense benefits of wide access to infrastructure: 
broad, low-cost licensing of the fundamental gene splicing technology 
enabled myriad applications to develop. Given the rapidity of gene 
splicing’s adoption, raising licensing fees or otherwise restricting access 
to this technology would, in all likelihood, have significantly and 
negatively impacted the emergence of the biotechnology industry. 
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) offers an illuminating comparison. 
In 1987, the private biotechnology company Cetus developed and 
patented PCR, a foundational laboratory technique for generating many 
copies of particular DNA strands. The immense utility of PCR, coupled 
with both reasonably priced licenses and rampant infringement, led to its 
broad adoption.300 After a few years, PCR became “an indispensable 
research tool employed in nearly every biological field.”301 After PCR 
had significantly penetrated the biomedical research sector, Cetus 
threatened to aggressively enforce its patent against firms engaged in 
pharmaceutical development, and even threatened suit against 
noncommercial, academic researchers who shared their PCR-enabled 
research with industry.302 While Cetus did not follow through with its 
threats, this example demonstrates the risks of strong exclusive rights on 
an infrastructural resource subject to rapid and widespread adoption. 
Human embryonic stem cells are another technology that achieved 
infrastructural status only a few years after patenting.303 James Thomson, 
                                                     
297. Feldman, supra note 296, at 25. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. at 20, 23. Presently, the patent term is twenty years. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). 
300. Joe Fore, Jr. et al., The Effects of Business Practices, Licensing, and Intellectual Property on 
Development and Dissemination of the Polymerase Chain Reaction: Case Study, 1 J. BIOMEDICAL 
DISCOVERY AND COLLABORATION 7, *14−15 (July 3, 2006). 
301. Id. at *2. 
302. See Cetus To Exact Royalties from PCR Sales; Probe Absolves Convicted Rapist, BIOTECH. 
NEWSWATCH, Sept. 5, 1988, at 7. 
303. See Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery, supra note 10, at 108; Lee, Paradigm 
Shifts, supra note 287, at 692. 
02_LEE_FINAL.DOC 3/14/2008 1:41:54 PM 
The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure 
95 
a researcher at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, first isolated and 
purified human embryonic stem cells in 1998 and ultimately received 
two key patents on this “technology.”304 In a sense, stem cells are the 
quintessential infrastructure, for they retain the ability to differentiate 
into a wide array of particularized cells and have shown immense 
promise as the basis for a broad variety of regenerative therapies.305 
Despite only being about half-way through the term of the original 
patent, consensus has already developed that these assets are critical to a 
broad range of basic experimentation and applications.306 
Notwithstanding voluntary arrangements to license these cells to 
noncommercial, federally funded researchers on a royalty-free basis,307 
access to these cells has not met demand.308 While these patents 
currently face challenges on nonobviousness grounds,309 several years of 
exclusive rights have no doubt prevented some downstream research and 
development from occurring. Successful defense of these challenges 
may prolong this inhibition throughout the remaining years of the patent 
term. 
Standards in information technology are another kind of invention 
that can achieve infrastructural status well before the patent term 
expires.310 I focus here on “common platform” standards that facilitate 
                                                     
304. U.S. Patent No. 5,843,780 (filed Jan. 18, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 (filed June 26, 
1998). 
305. See Nat’l Insts. of Health, STEM CELL INFORMATION 1 
http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/info/basics/StemCellBasics.pdf. Although recent advances 
indicate that certain adult stem cells can be reprogrammed to function like embryonic stem cells, 
many in the scientific community believe that embryonic stem cells are still better suited to serve as 
the basis for new therapies. Colin Nickerson, Caution Urged in New Method for Stem Cells: 
Harvard Sticks to Cloning, BOST. GLOBE, Dec. 17, 2007, at 1A.  
306. See Hazuka, supra note 3, at 164−65 (describing various potential uses of embryonic stem 
cells); Nat’l Insts. of Health, supra note 305 (listing various uses). 
307. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, the holder of the two stem cell patents, see supra 
note 304, signed a Memorandum of Understanding allowing the NIH to retain rights to the ’780 
patent because federal grants funded the underlying research. See also Josephine Johnston & Angela 
A. Wasunna, Patents, Biomedical Research, and Treatments: Examining Concerns, Canvassing 
Solutions, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Jan.–Feb. 2007, at s12; Loring & Campbell, supra note 3, at 
1717. 
308. See, e.g., Singer, Stem Cells Stuck, supra note 3; Loring & Campbell, supra note 3, at 1716–
17. 
309. Andrew Pollack, 3 Patents on Stem Cells Are Revoked in Initial Review, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 
2007, at C2.  
310. See generally Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623 (2002); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-
Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002) [hereinafter Lemley, Standard-Setting 
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interoperability in information technology networks.311 Patents on strong 
network standards can create durable market power in these fields.312 
The infrastructural nature of standards, which generate immense value 
from widespread use by a particular inventive community, has motivated 
calls to limit exclusive rights over them.313 While many standard-setting 
organizations (SSOs) favor “open” rather than proprietary standards, 
patented inventions do find their way into widely adopted standards.314 
For example, in 1994, several SSOs created the Joint Photographic 
Experts Group (JPEG) standard for compressing photographic images. 
Within three years, the standard became a fundamental mass-marketed 
technology.315 In 2002, video networking company Forgent Networks 
asserted patent rights over the technology underlying JPEG. Forgent 
collected over $100 million in royalties before a consortium of 
information technology companies challenged the validity of the patent, 
resulting in settlement.316 As this episode illustrates, in the context of 
patented information technology standards,317 rapid adoption coupled 
with strong rights to exclude may allow a single actor to hinder 
productivity throughout an entire industry.318 Taken together, these case 
studies show that certain patented technologies attain infrastructural 
status very quickly, revealing a need to relax exclusive rights during the 
patent term. 
                                                     
Organizations]. 
311. See O’Rourke, supra note 22, at 1179 (“[I]n the market for operating systems software, 
which exhibits powerful network effects, strong patent protection can create an insurmountable 
barrier to entry while also allowing a single patentee to direct innovation in the market for 
applications running on the dominant system.”). 
312. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 132, at 22. 
313. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Questioning Copyrights in Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 
193 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not 
To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley, Patent Holdup of Standards]. 
314. See Lemley, Standard-Setting Organizations, supra note 310, at 1893. 
315. Priscilla Caplan, Patents and Open Standards, INFO. STANDARDS QUARTERLY, Oct. 2003, at 
1, 2. 
316. See Kannellos, supra note 6. 
317. Although not relevant to JPEG, the problem of patented standards is accentuated where a 
single standard is based on multiple patents, thus increasing negotiating and other licensing costs. 
See Lemley, Patent Holdup of Standards, supra note 313, at 152. 
318. See Greg R. Vetter, Open Source Licensing and Scattering Opportunism in Software 
Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 225, 230 (2007). 
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2. Challenges Undermining Voluntary Licensing of Patented 
Infrastructure 
These case studies suggest another mechanism that could in theory 
ameliorate patent law’s strict protection of patented infrastructure: 
voluntary licensing. However, voluntary arrangements may not provide 
adequate access to these foundational technologies. Standard economic 
theory generally predicts that patentees will efficiently license 
infrastructural technologies to allow all potentially valuable uses to 
occur.319 Thus, for example, some may argue that patents on 
infrastructural human embryonic stem cells are not problematic because 
a licensing market will develop to enable downstream uses of these 
assets. However, for a variety of reasons efficient licensing (from a 
society-wide perspective) may fail to arise. 
First, licensing transactions are complicated by the difficulty of 
valuing intellectual infrastructure.320 Valuation difficulties endemic to 
technology in general are exacerbated for infrastructural inventions such 
as isolated, purified human embryonic stem cells that enable an 
extremely broad range of applications. 
Second, private transactions will not always reflect the social benefits 
of utilizing infrastructure. When an individual uses infrastructure, such 
as when a researcher uses human embryonic stem cells to develop a new 
therapy, the price charged for the resulting product typically only 
captures a portion of the overall social benefit of the innovation. Put 
another way, society benefits more from an individual’s use of 
infrastructure than that individual benefits herself. Because exploiting 
infrastructure produces spillovers that are not appropriable by 
transacting parties, patentees will demand higher fees and licensees will 
insist on lower fees than would be socially optimal.321 
Third, strategic behavior in the form of holdouts by both patentees 
and prospective licensees may lead them to forgo deals that actually 
serve the best interests of both parties.322 
                                                     
319. See O’Rourke, supra note 22, at 1179. 
320. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 958; David J. Teece, The Market for Know-
How and the Efficient International Transfer of Technology, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., 
Nov. 1981, at 81, 86. 
321. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, at 257. 
322. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 19−23 (1982) (discussing 
bargaining theory generally); ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 350 (rev. 4th ed. 2007). 
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Fourth, patentees of infrastructural assets may exercise market power 
that leads them to demand supracompetitive prices.323 Infrastructure such 
as PCR and established interoperability standards lack adequate 
substitutes. Where prospective licensees have made “irreversible 
investments” in particular technological platforms, patentees may charge 
high licensing fees to exploit this reliance.324 For example, Rambus 
apparently attempted to corner the memory chip market by patenting key 
memory chips upon learning that they would become the industry 
standard.325 Establishing a uniformly high licensing fee is particularly 
likely where transaction costs prevent a patentee from negotiating 
different prices with different licensees. 
Fifth, as Professor Mark Lemley has thoroughly described, licensing 
transactions are costly.326 Aggregate transaction costs will be particularly 
high for infrastructural inventions needed by many parties.327 Finally, 
even if a patentee is willing to license such a technology at competitive 
prices, this may be only one of several inventions that a subsequent 
exploiter needs to use.328 As Professors Michael Heller and Rebecca 
Eisenberg have chronicled, the need to bundle licenses from many 
different patentees may give rise to a “tragedy of the anticommons” 
rendering some downstream lines of development prohibitively 
                                                     
323. Cf. Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 22, at 1058−59. While Lemley discusses 
strategic behavior involving an inventor and a subsequent improver, similar behavior may apply to 
licenses for users of patented infrastructure who do not intend to improve on the infrastructure. A 
monopolist will maximize price where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Because this 
monopoly price is higher than the competitive price (assuming a downward-sloping demand curve), 
some users will be “priced out” of the market and will not be able to access the good produced by 
the monopolist. MERGES ET AL., supra note 322, at 350. 
324. Lemley, Patent Holdup of Standards, supra note 313, at 154. 
325. See In re Rambus Inc., No. 9302, at 3-5, Opinion of the Commission (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006); 
Pamela A. MacLean, ‘Rambus’ Ruling is a Standards Landmark, THE NAT’L L. J., Oct. 24, 2006, at 
8; Lemley & Weiser, supra note 7, at 837−38. 
326. Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 22, at 1053−54; see also MERGES ET AL., 
supra note 322, at 350; FAROK J. CONTRACTOR, INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY LICENSING: 
COMPENSATION, COSTS AND NEGOTIATION 104−05 (1981) (noting that transaction costs averaged 
approximately $100,000 for typical licensing arrangements). 
327. Extrapolating to “primary” intellectual infrastructure, the transaction costs of licensing 
patented natural laws, physical principles, and abstract ideas to all potential users would be 
prohibitively high. For these types of assets, prospect theory, which emphasizes the efficiency of 
allowing one party to orchestrate the development of a given prospect, is largely inapplicable. See 
generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 
(1977) (discussing prospect theory). 
328. See Lemley, Patent Holdup of Standards, supra note 313, at 152 (describing the problem of 
royalty-stacking in the information technology sector). 
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expensive.329 In sum, voluntarily licensing may not provide adequate 
access to patented intellectual infrastructure. 
3. The Nature of Patent Rights and Their Acquisition 
Another potential justification for patent law’s unique approach to 
infrastructure is that, unlike trademarks and copyrights, patents do not 
implicate First Amendment concerns. Trademarks have become valuable 
mechanisms of expression, particularly in popular culture.330 
Furthermore, it is well-recognized that the idea-expression dichotomy 
plays a critical role in balancing exclusive rights on texts with First 
Amendment interests in widely disseminating ideas.331 Perhaps courts 
justifiably pay greater attention to the downstream implications of 
exclusive rights in trademark and copyright law because of their 
potential burdens on speech, a concern that is perceived as absent from 
patent law.332 However, concerns over inhibiting speech only strengthen 
the principle that intellectual property is and should be attentive to the 
implications of upstream exclusive rights on downstream activity. 
Furthermore, while the “speech” losses from upstream exclusive rights 
are lower in patent law relative to trademark and copyright law, the 
“utility” losses from decreased access to foundational technologies are 
arguably greater. 
Another potential explanation for patent law’s uniquely narrow and 
formalistic approach to defining intellectual infrastructure relates to the 
substantive hurdles necessary to obtain a patent.333 Unlike trademarks 
                                                     
329. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 698–701. See generally Michael A. Heller, The 
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
621 (1998). 
330. See Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity, supra note 87, at 397. 
331. See Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free 
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1189−93 (1970). 
332. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual 
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 237 (1998) (“[P]atent law is qualitatively different from 
copyright law because most of the acts it restricts don’t involve speech at all.”). For a potential 
counterargument that patents in research science may implicate First Amendment concerns, see 
John A. Robertson, The Scientist’s Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1203, 1252 (1978). See also Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99 (2000). 
333. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1971) (“[The 
patent] monopoly . . . is carefully circumscribed by substantive and procedural protections.”); 
O’Rourke, supra note 22, at 1184 (observing that copyright law has few requirements for initial 
protection but greater flexibility to subsequently limit that protection, while patent law reflects the 
reverse situation). 
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and copyrights, patents undergo a rigorous examination process.334 
Examiners at the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) assess whether an 
invention satisfies certain statutorily defined criteria, including novelty, 
utility, and nonobviousness.335 During prosecution, the PTO may compel 
the patent applicant to narrow her claims, thus broadening the space 
available to subsequent innovators in the same field.336 One might argue 
that these substantive requirements ensure that only inventions that truly 
advance the state of the art receive patents and that this is an ideal 
outcome. However, this argument misses the point. It is precisely 
because some inventions are too meritorious and too valuable that they 
become indispensable intellectual infrastructure meriting wide 
availability.337 The PTO’s rigorous examination of patentability neither 
directly addresses nor mitigates the problem of productivity losses 
arising from exclusive rights on productivity-enabling infrastructure. 
A further reason for patent law’s divergent approach from trademark 
and copyright law relates to differences in the timing of the relevant 
intellectual infrastructure inquiries. As a general matter, courts 
determine genericity and apply the idea-expression dichotomy and 
scenes a faire doctrine in the context of an infringement action. At that 
point, usually long after a mark or text has been created, courts have a 
wealth of social data from which to draw when analyzing whether 
elements of those creations have achieved infrastructural status. For 
trademarks, courts consider consumer surveys, market information, 
brochures, and dictionaries to ascertain whether a trademark has become 
a generic word.338 In copyright law, courts can consider the relative 
success of the original work, commonality with other works, and 
                                                     
334. 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). The Patent and Trademark Office does examine 
applications to register trademarks on the principal register. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000). However, this 
examination is not nearly as extensive as patent examination, and marks are protectable even 
without registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (establishing “false designation of origin” 
protection for unregistered marks). 
335. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101−103 (2000). 
336. See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 22, at 1000−03; Merges & Nelson, 
supra note 285, at 843. 
337. While I do not articulate here a strict constructivist theory of technology contending that the 
meaning of technology is entirely contingent on social perception, such a theory does help 
legitimate communal claims over widely needed patented infrastructure. See Cohen, Creativity and 
Culture, supra note 35, at 1183−84 (discussing strict constructivist theory relating to texts and 
technology). 
338. See supra Part III.A; Am. Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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patterns of social adoption in determining whether specific elements of 
that work are stock or standard and thus nonprotectable. 
The timing of the analysis is different in patent law. The PTO first 
determines patentable subject matter, which is the analogous inquiry into 
intellectual infrastructure, at the time of patent issuance.339 At this point, 
there is little or no social data on the invention to consider, thus leading 
these determinations to be formalistic rather than functionally attentive 
to social use. While the issue of patentable subject matter can be 
litigated in an infringement action, the statutory design of this 
requirement as a threshold condition for patent issuance discourages 
considering an invention’s social history and context. An ideal 
“infrastructural” analysis would explicitly consider social data on a 
patented invention and its adoption in determining whether it merits 
liberalized access. Even more, this analysis would be highly 
contextualized to specific cases, distinguishing between infrastructural 
and non-infrastructural uses of the same patented invention. 
Finally, in addition to the problem of timing, courts are naturally 
hesitant to invalidate patents on infrastructural inventions because doing 
so would undermine incentives to invent. While open access to existing 
patented infrastructure helps optimize its exploitation, eliminating patent 
rights would discourage future inventors from creating new 
infrastructure in the next round of innovation.340 This concern is 
inapposite to trademark law, which does not exist to encourage creating 
more trademarks. It is attenuated in copyright law, where the cost of 
developing “new” ideas and scenes a faire is relatively low. However, 
the need to maintain some return on investment is critical to developers 
of technological infrastructure, thus counseling against simply relegating 
such inventions to the public domain. 
As we have seen, the relatively brief term of protection, availability of 
licensing, perceived absence of First Amendment concerns, and 
substantive examination process characteristic of patents do not justify 
patent law’s rigid approach to intellectual infrastructure. However, the 
timing of patent law’s infrastructure inquiry and the need to maintain 
incentives to invent are key differences that warrant attention. A recent 
Supreme Court case offers solutions to both the problems of timing and 
                                                     
339. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
340. Cf. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting 
that subjecting research tools to the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) research exception would compromise 
incentives to invent those foundational technologies). 
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incentives, thus opening the door for a more nuanced and functional 
approach to identifying and protecting patented intellectual 
infrastructure. In so doing, it provides a guide for fruitfully navigating 
the wide gray area between open access and exclusive rights to allow for 
use-specific, compensation-dependent access to patented infrastructure. 
IV.  INCORPORATING INFRASTRUCTURAL ANALYSIS IN 
DETERMINING PATENT INFRINGEMENT REMEDIES: A 
PROPOSAL FOR APPLYING eBAY INC. v. MERCEXCHANGE, 
L.L.C. 
A. Denying Injunctions and Allowing Liability Rule Protection for 
Infrastructural Uses of Patented Inventions 
Viewed through the lens of infrastructure theory, the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. provides an 
immensely valuable framework for liberalizing access to patented 
infrastructure on a dynamic basis.341 In eBay, the Supreme Court 
provided courts with greater flexibility to deny injunctions in patent 
infringement cases, thus opening the door for protecting patented 
inventions with a liability rule rather than a property rule.342 I propose a 
two-tiered system in which courts continue to protect ordinary 
inventions serving a non-infrastructural role with a property rule (via 
injunctive relief) but protect patented inventions serving as infrastructure 
with a liability rule (via royalties) in certain circumstances.343 Applying 
this proposal, courts should deny injunctions in cases of patent 
infringement that meet three criteria: (1) the infringed patent claims an 
infrastructural invention, (2) the infringer is actually using the patented 
invention in an infrastructural manner, and (3) the patented invention is 
not reasonably available through licensing.344 In such cases, denying 
injunctions creates the opportunity for continued infringement of an 
infrastructural resource contingent on the defendant paying court-
determined royalties. However, my proposal would preserve ample 
opportunities for parties to voluntarily negotiate a license, but against the 
                                                     
341. 547 U.S. __ , 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). 
342. See id. at 1839. 
343. Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1092 (describing entitlements as protected by 
either a property or liability rule). 
344. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
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changed background of liability rules rather than property rules. 
Ultimately, this proposal builds a valuable social feedback mechanism 
into patent law. It provides use-specific, compensation-dependent access 
to patented technologies that become infrastructure during the patent 
term, thus promoting downstream productivity while maintaining 
upstream incentives to invent. 
1. The eBay Decision 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. significantly changed the law of 
patent remedies.345 In that case, eBay and Half.com, a wholly owned 
subsidiary, infringed MercExchange’s business method patent for an 
electronic market.346 However, the district court denied MercExchange’s 
motion for permanent injunctive relief.347 The Federal Circuit reversed, 
applying its “‘general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions 
against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.’”348 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit. Writing for the 
majority, Justice Thomas held that the decision to grant or deny 
injunctive relief rests within the discretion of the district court, 
consistent with traditional equitable principles.349 Within this 
framework, 
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an 
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as 
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; 
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) 
that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction.350 
eBay is a simple holding with profound implications. Courts are no 
longer constrained to a syllogism wherein patent infringement leads 
inexorably to an injunction. The possibility of denying an injunction and 
                                                     
345. While the law changed significantly, there is open debate as to whether courts will 
substantially deviate from the general practice of granting injunctions. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at __, 
126 S. Ct. at 1841−42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that courts will continue to grant 
injunctions in most patent infringement cases). 
346. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698–99 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
347. Id. at 715. 
348. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at __, 126 S.Ct. at 1839 (quoting MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339). 
349. Id. at 1841. 
350. Id. at 1839. 
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allowing infringement to continue contingent on paying royalties—in 
essence, protecting a patent with a liability rule—offers important 
flexibility to courts.351 In particular, eBay opens the door for a social 
feedback mechanism in patent law that relaxes exclusive rights on 
inventions that become infrastructure. 
I argue that courts in patent infringement cases should consider the 
infrastructural use of a patented invention within the eBay framework, 
denying injunctive relief where appropriate to allow continued use of 
foundational technologies. The first eBay factor, irreparable harm to the 
plaintiff, may be difficult to establish by patentees of infrastructural 
technologies. Continued infringement by a particular user (who must pay 
an ongoing royalty) does not prevent the patentee from licensing to other 
users.352 Furthermore, the “upstream” nature of infrastructure means that 
infringing users typically operate in “downstream” markets and do not 
directly compete with the patentee. Because the infringer and patentee 
do not directly compete with each other, denying an injunction will not 
cause the patentee to lose brand name recognition or market share, 
factors that ordinarily weigh towards establishing irreparable harm.353 
For related reasons, it will be difficult for patentees of infrastructural 
technologies to establish the second factor, the inadequacy of legal 
remedies. Without losing brand name recognition or market share, for 
which an injunction would be an appropriate remedy, monetary damages 
should be sufficient to compensate the patentee. While calculating 
damages is difficult, these difficulties are surmountable and would not 
render legal remedies inadequate.354 
Within eBay’s equitable framework, the third (relative hardship of an 
injunction) and fourth (public interest) factors are particularly relevant 
for determining that a patented invention serving as infrastructure should 
not receive injunctive protection.355 Regarding the third factor, the 
relative hardship of an injunction will fall heavily on the defendant, for 
whom the patented item is indispensable for a particular line of research 
or development. Downstream parties enjoined from using polymerase 
chain reaction, embryonic stem cells, and patented interoperability 
standards would be severely hampered in their productive pursuits. 
                                                     
351. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21. 
352. See z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2006). 
353. See id.  
354. See infra Part IV.E. 
355. See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 1839.  
02_LEE_FINAL.DOC 3/14/2008 1:41:54 PM 
The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure 
105 
Under eBay, courts also consider the availability of other remedies to a 
patentee in determining the relative hardship of an injunction. In many 
cases, monetary damages will be adequate to compensate patentees, thus 
lessening their relative hardship. 
The fourth factor, the public interest, counsels even more strongly 
against enjoining infrastructural use of patented inventions. Inventive 
communities benefit greatly from access to infrastructure because of its 
productivity-enhancing qualities, wide ranging applicability, and general 
lack of substitutes. Furthermore, because inventors typically capture 
only a small proportion of the social value of their inventions, the 
widespread use of infrastructure generates immense spillovers benefiting 
society at large.356 Additionally, allowing liability rule protection will 
not overly compromise the public’s interest in maintaining incentives to 
invent.357 Under this proposed application of eBay, infringement is not 
free. Infringers who are not enjoined must pay damages to patentees for 
any ongoing use, thus allowing patentees to recoup their investment 
costs and encouraging future innovation.358 
In considering the public interest, courts should also consider non-
patent incentives driving the creation of particular inventions. Patents 
provide incentives to invent, but they also impose a social cost, 
measured by the access constraints enabled by exclusive rights. To the 
extent that exclusive rights are not necessary to motivate invention, these 
distributional losses are not socially justified. In a significant number of 
instances—particularly in biotechnology—the federal government has 
funded the development of infrastructural technologies that are then 
patented.359 Federal funding of inventions severely attenuates the 
incentive rationale for patents, and such public funding should militate 
                                                     
356. Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, at 268−70. 
357. See Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that 
public policy favors enforcing patent rights). 
358. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2504−05 (1994). 
359. The National Institutes of Health provide $28 billion in funding for basic scientific research 
every year. NIH - Overview, http://www.nih.gov/about/NIHoverview.html (last visited Dec. 17, 
2007). Indeed, the NIH funded a considerable portion of the research leading to James Thomson’s 
patents on human embryonic stem cells. Federally funded researchers enjoy a “double bonus” 
because of the federal Bayh-Dole Act, which allows recipients of federal funds to patent any 
inventions arising from taxpayer-supported research. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2000 & Supp. V 
2005). See generally Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of 
Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003). 
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against protecting resulting inventions with an injunction.360 Although 
much more difficult to analyze, where the incentives of self-use and self-
benefit have motivated a patentee to develop an invention, the rationale 
for strict property rule protection of that patent is also undermined.361 
In sum, courts should consider infrastructural use of a patented 
invention when applying eBay, with such use weighing against granting 
an injunction and in favor of maintaining access to that foundational 
technology. This proposal does not represent a radical departure from 
existing precedent, but arises organically within the eBay framework. 
Indeed, considering the infrastructural use of a patented invention is 
arguably necessary under eBay’s equitable test. 
2. The Proposed Application of eBay 
This proposed application of eBay aims to promote inventive activity 
and only applies to a relatively narrow set of situations involving 
patented infrastructure. This proposal creates two tiers of patent 
protection. Ordinary patented inventions not used as infrastructure 
would continue to be subject to traditional property rule protection upon 
infringement. However, infrastructural use of a foundational patented 
technology would, on a case-by-case basis, militate against imposing an 
injunction if that technology is not otherwise reasonably available 
through voluntary licensing. 
Accordingly, for courts to deny injunctions and allow liability rule 
protection in cases of patent infringement, three conditions must be 
satisfied. First, a patented invention must qualify as intellectual 
infrastructure, meaning it must be: (1) a nonrival resource, (2) valuable 
primarily for its enabling capabilities, and (3) a means to a wide variety 
of downstream applications.362 Second, the infringer must be using the 
invention in an infrastructural capacity, taking advantage of its particular 
enabling properties. Third, a court must conclude that efficient licensing 
                                                     
  360. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 359, at 300. 
361. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, (Mar. 
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=969399. 
362. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 956. These factors suggest an implicit 
fourth factor characterizing infrastructure: lack of adequate substitutes. For example, the industry-
wide “irreversible investments” made in adopting a patented standard such as JPEG may render 
other standards inadequate substitutes. See Lemley, Patent Holdup of Standards, supra note 313, at 
154. In other cases, the unique properties of the infrastructural invention, as with human embryonic 
stem cells, make it nearly impossible to substitute. In still other cases, the sheer technological 
ingenuity of an invention helps it both enable a wide array of downstream applications and render 
any potential substitutes inadequate, as with gene splicing. 
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and attendant widespread accessibility has not and is not likely to occur. 
This means that voluntary, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory licensing, 
either directly by the patentee, or as mediated by a standard-setting 
organization,363 would not trigger liability rule protection. This proposal 
allows parties to voluntarily license their patented infrastructure widely, 
but preserves the possibility of a liability rule as a backstop if such 
licensing does not arise. 
Regarding the first condition, the range of patented technologies 
qualifying as infrastructure would be narrow but significant. Familiar 
examples include gene splicing, polymerase chain reaction, human 
embryonic stem cells, and information technology standards.364 
Comparing these technologies indicates that two classes of technologies 
would satisfy the threshold determination as “infrastructure.” The first 
class includes patented technologies whose widespread licensing and 
adoption clearly establishes their infrastructural status. Low-cost 
licensing of gene splicing and no-cost licensing of the JPEG standard 
engendered widespread adoption and reliance, helping these assets 
become infrastructure. My proposal would prevent patentees from 
subsequently exploiting this reliance by significantly raising licensing 
fees or otherwise restricting access to these inventions, a strategy that 
Cetus and Forgent attempted with PCR and the JPEG standard, 
respectively.365 My approach is conceptually related to estoppel, but 
would not require any element of patentee deception.366 In this manner, 
the custom of biomedical researchers and software developers of using 
patented infrastructure at reasonable cost would remain undisturbed, like 
the public’s tradition of using a particular open field for a communal 
dance.367 
However, correlating a liability rule with widespread adoption of an 
invention may discourage a patentee from licensing it widely in the first 
place, which is far from ideal. Therefore, this proposal would also apply 
                                                     
363. Lemley, Patent Holdup of Standards, supra note 313, at 156−57. 
364. See supra Part III.D.1. While empirical evidence from the biotechnology sector suggests that 
patentees often refrain from suing basic researchers who infringe their patents, my proposal offers a 
sustainable and simple doctrinal solution that does not rely on the unpredictable forbearance of 
patentees to ensure access to proprietary infrastructure. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents (July 
3, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999961. 
365.  See supra Part III.D.1. 
366. See Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1325 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
367. See Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, supra note 28, at 760. 
02_LEE_FINAL.DOC 3/14/2008 1:41:54 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 83:39, 2008 
108 
to a second class of inventions: patented technologies whose limited 
availability has demonstrated a significant potential for widespread 
infrastructural use.368 For example, while licensed selectively, the early 
availability of human embryonic stem cells established their immense 
potential as basic research and development infrastructure. Such 
inventions would also qualify as infrastructure. 
In tandem, these two classes address the chicken-and-egg problem of 
what comes first—widespread social adoption or infrastructural status. 
Inventions that have achieved infrastructural status, as well as those that 
would achieve that status “but for” their limited availability, would both 
satisfy the threshold classification as infrastructure. 
Regarding the second condition, liability rule protection would only 
be available in cases where an infringer is using an infrastructural 
invention as infrastructure. As we have seen from trademark and 
copyright law, what is infrastructure in one context may be protectable 
application in another. Thus, in Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., the word 
“aspirin” was generic for lay consumers but a particularized trademark 
for chemists, physicians, and druggists.369 Similarly, in copyright, a 
Swiss bank account may constitute a scene a faire in an international 
espionage story but may be protectable expression in a tale about 
invading aliens. Accordingly, using patented infrastructural technology 
for non-infrastructural uses would not trigger liability rule protection. 
For example, using human embryonic stem cells to develop a therapy for 
Parkinson’s disease that exploits the unique properties of those cells 
would constitute an infrastructural use. Experimenting on stem cells to 
investigate the general properties of cell membranes, where other types 
of cells would be adequate substitutes for such research, would 
constitute a non-infrastructural use. This proposal for applying eBay is 
based on the premise that liberal access to infrastructure promotes 
productivity. Accordingly, only those uses of infrastructural inventions 
that take advantage of their unique enabling capabilities would qualify 
for liability rule treatment. 
Finally, potential liability rule protection would not be available if the 
invention were available to the infringer through reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory licensing. Court-determined ongoing royalties are 
                                                     
368. Cf. Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 534, 593 (2003) (“[I]f it seems clear that a single standard will emerge as dominant, the law 
should facilitate competition within . . . the platform standard by allowing horizontal access.”). 
369. 272 F. 505, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
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designed to address situations where negotiations have failed, not to 
replace market transactions. While determining the reasonableness of a 
prevailing licensing fee is no easy task, courts could rely on established 
doctrinal frameworks for determining reasonable royalties to guide 
them.370 
In this context, it is important to stress that this proposal preserves 
ample opportunities for parties to voluntarily negotiate a license, thus 
incorporating the Federal Circuit’s recommended approach to 
implementing eBay.371 Whereas the threat of an injunction skews the 
balance of power in favor of a patentee,372 negotiating in the shadow of a 
potential liability rule provides more leverage for a prospective licensee 
to demand lower licensing fees.373 Before litigation, the murky prospect 
of receiving damages upon a finding of infringement may encourage 
patentees to reduce or simply pay the transaction costs necessary to 
strike deals with willing licensees. While potential liability rule 
protection may be perceived as decreasing the incentives of prospective 
licensees to negotiate (because they can simply hold out for a court-
determined royalty), the uncertainty, length, and cost of litigation still 
provide ample motivation for these parties to actually negotiate licenses. 
My proposal is best understood not as a substitute for private ordering, 
but as an action-forcing mechanism that will motivate patentees to come 
to the negotiating table and rationalize the balance of power once they 
get there. 
At the close of litigation, if a court has denied an injunction under 
eBay, another opportunity for negotiation arises. In this situation, judges 
should encourage parties to voluntarily negotiate a license against the 
backdrop of imminent court-determined royalties. Relative to 
negotiations before litigation, the certainty that a court will impose an 
ongoing royalty (coupled with uncertainty as to the terms of the royalty) 
may motivate a patentee and prospective licensee to strike a deal. This 
process of utilizing a court-determined liability rule solely as a last resort 
encourages parties to voluntarily agree to terms. 
                                                     
370. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) 
(establishing a fifteen-factor framework for determining reasonable royalties); infra Part IV.E. 
371. See Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“In most 
cases, where the district court determines that a permanent injunction is not warranted, the district 
court may wish to allow the parties to negotiate a license amongst themselves regarding future use 
of a patented invention before imposing an ongoing royalty.”). 
372. MERGES ET AL., supra note 322, at 349. 
373. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 325, at 795. 
02_LEE_FINAL.DOC 3/14/2008 1:41:54 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 83:39, 2008 
110 
B. Merits Relative to Other Potential Solutions 
The primary advantage of this proposal is the use of liability rules to 
provide mediated access to patented technologies.374 This proposal 
provides for compensation-dependent, use-specific access to patented 
infrastructure when mixed supply-side and demand-side considerations 
render a binary choice between open access and exclusive rights 
inadequate. This proposal differs from suggestions to simply place 
infrastructural technologies in the public domain375 and offers an 
analytically robust method for handling “difficult” cases of infrastructure 
access. 
Generic words, literary ideas, natural laws, physical phenomena, and 
abstract technical ideas are clear candidates for open access based on 
both supply-side and demand-side considerations. From the supply side, 
exclusive rights are generally perceived as unnecessary for producing 
generic words, ideas, and basic scientific knowledge.376 From the 
demand side, these foundational assets enable such a wide range of 
downstream uses that users’ interest in freely accessing them is high. 
Thus, there are relatively few disadvantages and many advantages to 
maintaining this primary infrastructure in the public domain. 
The situation is more complex for patented infrastructural 
technologies such as isolated, purified human embryonic stem cells. 
From the supply side, this “value-added” infrastructure is costly to 
develop, and simply equating infrastructure with open access would 
undermine incentives to invent.377 From the demand side, these 
                                                     
374. Others have also argued in favor of liability rules to provide compensation to innovators 
while allowing access to protected innovations. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 358, at 2504−05; 
Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2370 (1994). My proposal is unique in situating liability rule protection for 
patented infrastructure within the Supreme Court’s eBay framework. 
375. Cf. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 922−23; Frischmann & Lemley, supra 
note 26, at 282 (“Frischmann’s organizing heuristic is ‘if infrastructure, then commons.’”). 
376. This is, of course, a highly debatable premise. However, intrinsic motivations to create, 
government funding of basic research, and norms of non-exclusivity in academic science suggest 
that economic incentives may not be as necessary to produce this primary infrastructure. See 
MERTON, supra note 153, at 270−78 (discussing traditional scientific norms such as 
disinterestedness, according to which scientists do not pursue basic research for financial gain); 
Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961, 961 (2d Cir. 1944) (stating that pecuniary incentives 
do not motivate basic scientific research). Furthermore, while companies invest considerable 
resources to create new marks that become generic words, trademark law does not exist to 
encourage new trademarks, and neologisms generally arise organically from culture, free of charge. 
See Lemley, Lanham Act, supra note 39, at 1695. 
377. Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 26, at 282 (“One cannot automatically make the 
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infrastructural assets enable a smaller range of downstream applications 
than “primary” infrastructure such as natural laws, physical phenomena, 
and abstract ideas. Furthermore, some downstream uses of these assets 
may be non-infrastructural. Therefore, the argument for categorically 
relegating these infrastructural technologies to the public domain is 
attenuated. For these difficult cases, my proposal addresses supply-side 
needs to maintain incentives to invent by compelling an infringer of 
patented infrastructure to compensate the patentee.378 Regarding the 
demand side, the fact-intensive and case-specific eBay analysis can 
distinguish between non-infrastructural and infrastructural uses of 
patented inventions, leading courts to only exempt the latter from 
injunctive relief. 
This proposal also offers advantages relative to a compulsory 
licensing scheme, where Congress or an agency would determine pre-set 
fees for licensing patented infrastructure.379 It is not clear how a rule-
making body would define, a priori, the kinds of inventions that should 
be subject to infrastructural treatment. Given the rapid dynamics of the 
biotechnology and information technology sectors, as well as the fact 
that infrastructural status is highly use specific, courts are in a better 
position to identify infrastructural uses of patented technology on a case-
by-case basis. Further arguing against compulsory licenses is Professor 
Robert Merges’s observation that such licenses discourage industry 
players from resolving patent issues through voluntary negotiations.380 
The possibility that a court will apply liability rules at the end of a long 
and expensive patent infringement suit leaves enough flexibility (and 
uncertainty) to motivate parties to negotiate a license before any 
contemplated infringement. 
                                                     
infrastructure-commons equation, particularly where IP is concerned, since producers need some 
incentive to innovate.”).  
378. This proposal would rely on existing measures of damages, which at a minimum award a 
“reasonable royalty” to the patentee. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). For firms that first licensed widely 
and then increased fees, prior licensing fees would provide a guide for reasonable royalties. 
Disgorging all profits based on unjust enrichment would overly deter unlicensed use of patented 
infrastructure and would thus be inappropriate. See Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, 
Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Intellectual Property, 32 RAND J. ECON. 199, 218 (2001). 
379. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (establishing a compulsory license fee schedule for recording 
cover songs). 
380. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1391−92 (1996) [hereinafter Merges, 
Liability Rules]. 
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C. Courts’ Attentiveness to Downstream Progress in the Wake of 
eBay 
Early decisions in the wake of eBay reflect courts’ newfound 
attentiveness to the downstream implications of upstream patents and 
illustrate the workability of the proposal advanced here.381 In z4 
Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,382 a jury found that Microsoft’s 
Windows and Office software products infringed z4’s patents on 
software activation technology.383 However, the district court denied 
z4’s motion for injunctive relief. Applying the balance of hardships test, 
the court observed that an injunction against Microsoft would necessitate 
re-releasing 450 versions of Office and 600 versions of Windows.384 The 
court also found that damages could adequately compensate z4 for the 
infringement385 and concluded that the balance of hardships from an 
injunction favored Microsoft.386 Regarding the public interest, the court 
gave substantial weight to the widespread use of Windows and Office 
and to the worldwide implications of a mandatory re-release.387 The 
court found that enjoining Microsoft could disrupt its product 
distribution and if so, “would have an effect on the public due to the 
public’s undisputed and enormous reliance on these products.”388 Given 
the public’s widespread adoption of these products, the potential 
productivity losses from a re-release, and the absence of significant 
public benefits arising from an injunction, the court concluded that the 
public interest weighed against enjoining Microsoft’s infringement.389 
Considerations of downstream productivity led the court to protect z4’s 
patented invention with a liability rule rather than a property rule.390 
                                                     
381. This contextual examination of a patented technology’s impact on society finds some 
parallel in calls for agencies to better incorporate social context when making decisions in the realm 
of environmental law and policy. See Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions under the Endangered 
Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1152−53 
(1997). 
382. 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).  
383. Id. at 438. The jury also found that co-defendant Autodesk had infringed z4’s patents. Id.  
384. Id. at 442. 
385. Id. at 441–42. 
386. Id. at 442−44.  
387. Id. at 443 (“Microsoft’s Windows and Office software products are likely the most popular 
software products in the world.”). 
388. Id. at 443−44 (emphasis added). 
389. Id. at 444. 
390. Microsoft had indicated that it would phase out all infringing products starting with the 
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Similarly, in Paice v. Toyota Motor Corp., 391 a jury found that Toyota 
had infringed Paice’s patents on hybrid engine technology, but the 
district court denied Paice’s request for an injunction.392 Invoking eBay, 
the court noted that the balance of hardships favored Toyota.393 If Paice 
received the permanent injunction, “[t]he burgeoning hybrid market 
could . . . be stifled as the research and expense of bringing [Toyota’s] 
product line to market would be frustrated.”394 Here, productivity 
concerns led the court to protect Paice’s patented invention with an 
ongoing royalty rather than an injunction.395 
Of course, one must place these decisions in context. Paice was 
arguably a “patent troll,” as it did not actually practice the patents upon 
which it was suing.396 Additionally, in both cases, the patented 
technologies represented relatively small components of larger 
inventions—Microsoft Office and Windows in z4 and hybrid cars in 
Paice.397 While courts should consider status as a “troll” and a relatively 
small contribution to a larger invention in applying eBay, these factors 
will not necessarily apply to all cases of alleged infringement of patented 
infrastructure. 
In one important way, however, these decisions go beyond the 
proposal developed here. Significantly, neither z4 nor Paice involved 
intellectual infrastructure. Both inventions are nonrival inputs into 
downstream development. However, while the product activation 
component at issue in z4 was ultimately widely used, neither it nor the 
hybrid transmission claimed in Paice is so foundational to a broad array 
of downstream uses that it represents infrastructure. These were direct 
inputs to end-user goods, software and cars. Unlike infrastructural assets 
                                                     
release of Windows 2007 and Office 2007. Thus, the royalty rate was calculated for prospective 
sales over the two- to three-year phase-out period. Id. at 442. Ultimately, the jury awarded damages 
of $115 million against Microsoft and $18 million against co-defendant Autodesk. Id. at 438−39.  
391. No. 2:04-CV-211-DE, 2006 WL 2385139 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006). 
392. Id. 
393. Id. at *6. 
394. Id. 
395. On appeal, the Federal Circuit subsequently reversed and remanded to allow the district 
court to clarify its calculation of the ongoing royalty. Paice v. Toyota Motor Corp., Nos. 2006-1610, 
-1631, 2007 WL 3024994, at *19 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 2007).  
396. Paice, 2006 WL 2385139, at *2 (“Plaintiff does not manufacture competing vehicles, but 
rather is geared toward licensing its technology . . . .”). 
397. z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441 (E.D. Tex. 2006); Paice, 2006 
WL 2385139, at *5; see eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.__, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 
(2006). 
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such as gene splicing, PCR, human embryonic stem cells, and 
information technology standards, these technologies do not enable wide 
swaths of downstream productivity in innovation markets. The fact that 
concern for follow-on productivity motivated courts to protect non-
infrastructural inventions with liability rules renders it even more 
persuasive, a fortiori, that they should protect infrastructural inventions 
with liability rules. 
D. Advantages Relative to Current Practice and Other Intellectual 
Property Disciplines 
Allowing courts to consider infrastructural uses of patented inventions 
in determining whether to apply liability rule protection has several 
advantages. First, relative to current patent practice, determining 
intellectual infrastructure at the point of infringement allows courts to 
consider instructive social data on an invention. The PTO assesses 
patentable subject matter at the time of patent issuance. At this point, it 
is relatively easy to determine the formal “first layer” of intellectual 
infrastructure by inquiring if the patent claims a natural law, physical 
phenomenon, or abstract idea. At this early stage, however, it is almost 
impossible to predict what inventions, such as gene splicing or 
polymerase chain reaction, will become so widely needed and so 
indispensable for downstream development that they will constitute 
intellectual infrastructure. The invention at that time simply lacks the 
history necessary to make such a determination. Analyzing intellectual 
infrastructure at the time of infringement allows courts to consider a 
history of demonstrated social adoption and reliance, as well as an 
informative history of licensing. 
Second, folding the infrastructural inquiry into remedies analysis 
enables highly specific remedies. The four-factor equitable test at the 
heart of eBay shuns bright line, formalistic rules and encourages courts 
to consider context when determining infringement remedies.398 As 
discussed, whether or not a resource serves as infrastructure is highly 
contextual.399 Under this proposal, liability rule protection is use-specific 
and would not apply to infringers using foundational technologies in a 
non-infrastructural capacity.400 This is not a “pay-for-play” compulsory 
                                                     
398. See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 1839. 
399. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
400. My approach has some similarities to the fair use doctrine that Professor Maureen O’Rourke 
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license scheme in which certain patented inventions would be available 
for all uses upon payment of a fee.401 
Third, this framework particularly addresses strategic behavior by 
patent trolls holding patents on key infrastructure. In his concurring 
opinion in eBay, Justice Kennedy discussed patent trolls—firms that 
hold but do not practice patents, generating revenue through licensing 
fees and suing other firms for infringement.402 Such firms routinely use 
the threat of an injunction to inflate their licensing fees and proposed 
settlement amounts.403 Since trolls do not practice inventions, 
infringement by competitors does not erode their market share, thus 
rendering royalties an adequate remedy. For this and the reasons 
mentioned above, the relative hardship of an injunction in such cases 
would weigh heavily in favor of defendants. In addition, allowing firms 
that do not even practice their patents to exploit social reliance on these 
inventions to charge supracompetitive prices does not serve the public 
interest. Allowing liability rule protection for patented intellectual 
infrastructure held by trolls will help mitigate their threats of holdout. 
Finally, relative to copyright’s idea-expression dichotomy, this 
approach offers a more intellectually honest means of protecting 
intellectual infrastructure. Courts take a functional approach to the idea-
expression dichotomy, characterizing an element of an expressive work 
as an “idea” when they determine that it should be preserved in the 
public domain.404 Similarly, courts could take a wholly functional 
approach to interpreting the meaning of “natural laws, physical 
                                                     
suggests for patent law. See O’Rourke, supra note 22. However, my proposal differs from 
O’Rourke’s in both ends and means. O’Rourke, writing before eBay, recommended sui generis 
Congressional action to codify a fair use defense for patent law. Here, I situate infrastructure 
analysis within the now-existing eBay framework, which itself draws upon traditional equitable 
principles. See id. at 1210. Additionally, while O’Rourke focuses on the fair use doctrine’s 
emphasis on market failure, I draw from parallel regimes of relaxed protection of intellectual 
infrastructure in trademark, copyright, and patent. 
401. See Paice v. Toyota Motor Corp., Nos. 2006-1610, 2006-1631, 2007 WL 3024994, at *33 
n.13 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 2007) (“The term ‘compulsory license’ implies that anyone who meets 
certain criteria has congressional authority to use that which is licensed . . . . By contrast, the 
ongoing royalty order at issue here is limited to one particular set of defendants.”). 
402. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (“An industry has developed in which firms use 
patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing 
fees.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
403. See id. at 1842 (noting that for patentees, “an injunction, and the potentially serious 
sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees 
to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent”) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
404. See supra notes 228−232 and accompanying text. 
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phenomena, and abstract ideas” to keep certain technologies in the 
public domain.405 For example, courts could label human embryonic 
stem cells as nonpatentable “natural phenomena” and characterize 
information technology standards as “abstract ideas” to deny exclusive 
rights and promote downstream productivity. While demand-side 
considerations support such an interpretation,406 it is open to criticisms 
applying to the idea-expression dichotomy as being subjective and 
lacking analytical rigor.407 The JPEG standard does not become an 
abstract idea simply because its broad utility counsels that it should be 
widely available. Following Diamond v. Diehr, it is preferable to retain 
some analytical rigor around the threshold categories of patentable 
subject matter and to reserve further determinations of intellectual 
infrastructure for a separate inquiry.408 
E. Potential Critiques and Responses 
Of course, this proposal must address several critiques. First, 
differentiating between intellectual infrastructure and application is 
highly technical and raises institutional competence questions for 
courts.409 However, the downstream productivity analyses in z4 and 
Paice suggest that courts are capable of determining when liberalized 
access is warranted for patented upstream infrastructure.410 Just as courts 
in genericide cases consider market data, consumer surveys, and 
industry information in determining whether a trademark has become 
generic, courts in patent cases could consider similar evidence to 
determine whether a particular use of a patented invention is 
infrastructural. To address technical limitations, courts may also 
consider input from expert witnesses, SSOs, and agencies.411 
Second, the possibility of losing property rule protection upon 
widespread adoption of a patented infrastructural technology 
compromises a patentee’s incentives to develop that invention in the first 
place.412 This decreases incentives to invent precisely the kind of 
                                                     
405. See Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery, supra note 10. 
406. Id. 
407. See supra notes 219–226 and accompanying text. 
408. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1981). 
409. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 325, at 839−41. 
410. See supra Part IV.C. 
411. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 325, at 839−41. 
412. See Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 946; Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 
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infrastructural inventions that arguably contribute most to technological 
progress.413 However, aside from any explicit consideration of 
intellectual infrastructure, eBay already introduces uncertainty into how 
courts will resolve patent infringement suits.414 Firms now face a general 
risk that their patented inventions will be protected by a liability rule 
rather than a property rule upon infringement. The present proposal 
simply applies this flexibility in the helpful direction of allowing courts 
to allow infrastructural uses of patented technologies to continue. Most 
importantly, ongoing royalties mitigate the incentives problem: 
infringers will still have to compensate patentees—in some cases on 
terms the patentee has previously approved. 
Third, awarding damages gives rise to complicated valuation 
problems.415 As discussed, calculating appropriate royalties will be 
particularly difficult given the complexity of valuing infrastructure.416 
However, for infrastructural technologies that patentees have already 
licensed widely, royalties will correlate with previous licensing fees 
already adopted by the patentee. For the second class of technologies 
subject to this proposal, a limited history of licensing can guide courts in 
calculating appropriate royalties. It bears emphasizing that damages are 
the only remedy available for infringement occurring before litigation, 
so regardless of the imposition of a permanent injunction, courts cannot 
avoid the difficulties of valuing technology.417 District courts and the 
Federal Circuit have developed a sophisticated jurisprudence for 
calculating damages, and the valuation challenges do not appear to be 
                                                     
10; see Lemley & Weiser, supra note 325, at 798. 
413. See generally Lee, Paradigm Shifts, supra note 287 (arguing that, at a macroscopic level, 
strict patent protection of upstream assets may encourage paradigm shifts at the level of basic 
theory, thus helping science advance in the most revolutionary manner). The analysis here and in 
my other work calling for increased access to upstream inventions must be balanced against the rare 
but significant gains to be achieved from paradigm shifts resulting from compelling inventors to 
“design around” existing infrastructure. See generally Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific 
Discovery, supra note 10. 
414. See Lemley, Patent Holdup of Standards, supra note 313, at 167. But see eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.__, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841–42 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(suggesting that a “long tradition of equity practice” will lead courts to continue granting 
injunctions in most patent infringement cases)  
415. See supra, Part III.D.2; cf. Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1719, 1762−63 (2004) (arguing that information costs, including those related to valuation, render 
property rules preferable to liability rules). 
416. Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 958. 
417.  MERGES ET AL., supra note 322, at 349. 
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insurmountable.418 Again, courts could also consider the input of expert 
witnesses, SSOs, and agencies to help determine appropriate liability 
rule protection.419 
F. Summary: A Social Feedback Mechanism for Patent Law 
This proposed application of the eBay framework would bring patent 
law closer to its intellectual property siblings in accommodating the 
evolution of intellectual infrastructure. One could liken it to a doctrine of 
genericide for patents. If an invention becomes indispensable to a wide 
range of downstream applications, the patentee’s exclusive rights over it 
become attenuated. In a sense, innovative firms would be penalized for 
creating technologies that are so useful that they attain infrastructural 
status. This is analogous to genericide, where widespread use of a 
trademarked name can produce a term that is so valuable for general 
linguistic purposes that the trademark owner loses its exclusive rights.420 
One could also analogize this proposal to a doctrine of scenes a faire for 
patents. If a patented invention becomes “stock” or “standard” for 
conducting a wide range of valuable downstream research, it becomes 
subject to liberalized access.421 
                                                     
418. There are two prevailing methods for calculating damages: lost profits and reasonable 
royalties. To establish lost profits, a patentee must show: (1) demand for the patented product, (2) 
the absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) manufacturing and marketing capability to 
exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of profit the patentee would have made. Panduit Corp. v. 
Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). Because lost profits may be 
particularly difficult to calculate on a prospective basis, and because some patentees (such as 
universities) may lack manufacturing and marketing capability to practice their patents, reasonable 
royalties will generally be the preferred method of calculating damages under this proposal. 
Calculating a reasonable royalty “contemplates a hypothetical negotiation between the patentee and 
the infringer at a time before the infringement began.” Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 
F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002). While this involves a legal fiction, the widely adopted fifteen-
factor test articulated in Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood Corp. provides guidance for determining a 
reasonable royalty. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (including, as the fifteenth factor, 
“[t]he amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer) would have 
agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying 
to reach an agreement . . . .”). 
419. See Lemley & Weiser, supra note 325, at 840−41. 
420. See supra Part III.A. 
421. This proposal is conceptually similar to antitrust law’s essential facilities doctrine, which 
“imposes liability when one firm, which controls an essential facility, denies a second firm 
reasonable access to a product or service that the second firm must obtain in order to compete with 
the first.” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1991). See 
Frischmann, Economic Theory, supra note 15, at 963; Waller & Frischmann, supra note 76; see 
generally Robert Pitofsky, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under United States Antitrust Law, 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/pitofskyrobert.pdf; cf. Lee, Inverting the 
02_LEE_FINAL.DOC 3/14/2008 1:41:54 PM 
The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure 
119 
However, this proposal takes the unique characteristics of patent law 
into account and moves beyond a binary choice between open access 
and exclusive rights. It relies on voluntary negotiation and liability rules 
to provide qualified, compensation-dependent access to patented 
infrastructure.422 Instructive in this regard, courts in copyright cases have 
long endorsed liability rules to ensure downstream access to protected 
content while providing compensation to upstream creators.423 However, 
this Article’s proposal is more explicitly infrastructural in its orientation 
and seeks to liberalize access to generally needed “basic building 
blocks” of invention. This application of eBay thus solves two problems. 
It allows for a nuanced, contextual, and historical evaluation of whether 
a patented invention functions as intellectual infrastructure at the time of 
infringement. It also offers the flexibility of protecting that invention 
with a liability rule, thus balancing incentives to invent with access to 
foundational resources that facilitate invention. 
In sum, intellectual infrastructure and its responsiveness to evolving 
social practice reveal a natural limitation on exclusive rights in 
intangible entities. Rhetorical tropes such as the entrepreneurial firm, 
romantic author, and inventive genius have historically justified 
expansive intellectual property rights.424 However, intellectual property 
is not a natural right, but exists to promote society-wide progress.425 
Firms, authors, and inventors may receive exclusive rights on their 
creations, but those rights may not confer too much power. At a primary 
level, certain “raw” inputs, such as words, ideas, and natural principles, 
are preserved in the public domain as intellectual infrastructure. 
Infrastructure, however, is socially defined and consequently evolves. 
                                                     
Logic of Scientific Discovery, supra note 10, at 84 (arguing that a lack of substitutes for a patented 
research tool should weigh in favor of liberalizing access to it). 
422. Lemley & Weiser, supra note 325, at 785 (“Stated simply, where property rules have 
pernicious consequences, liability rules look better by comparison.”). 
423. See supra note 117. 
424. See Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property 
and the Public Domain Part I, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 11−12 (1993); Keith Aoki, Authors, 
Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public Domain Part II, 18 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 191 (1993); JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, & SPLEENS: LAW 
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 53–59 (1996); Jessica Litman, The Public 
Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 965 (1990). 
425. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mr. Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 355 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907) (“Considering the 
exclusive right to invention as given not of natural right, but for the benefit of society, I know well 
the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment 
of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.”). 
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Accordingly, doctrines aimed at preserving wide access to infrastructure 
should respond to accommodate this evolution. Firms may trademark 
names, but if those names enter the vernacular as generic words, they 
become freely appropriable to competitors and the public at large. 
Authors may copyright their texts, but common ideas and well-traveled 
expressions considered stock or standard are not protectable. Under the 
proposal here, inventions that become standard platforms for subsequent 
innovation would be open to downstream inventors on a liberalized, but 
not free, basis. Society at large, which imbues these creations with 
value,426 has certain claims on their availability.427 Where the community 
holds its public dances matters and may limit the exclusive rights 




To promote productivity, trademark, copyright, and patent law all 
distinguish between upstream intellectual infrastructure and downstream 
intellectual application. Trademark law ensures open access to generic 
words and only allows exclusive rights on terms that identify individual 
sources. Copyright law preserves ideas and stock expressions in the 
public domain, only granting protection to particularized expressions. 
Patent law maintains the free availability of natural laws, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas while only permitting ownership of 
refined inventions. Intellectual infrastructure, which comprises nonrival 
assets valuable as inputs to a wide array of downstream uses, remains 
open to all. 
Infrastructure, however, is a moving target. Accordingly, this Article 
has compared doctrines ensuring access to intellectual infrastructure 
based on their responsiveness to infrastructural evolution. Trademark’s 
doctrine of genericide is highly attentive to linguistic change and relies 
on timely social data to determine if and when a protected mark has 
become a generic word. Copyright law occupies an intermediate 
                                                     
426. Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in 
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1588 n.277 (1992–1993) (noting that 
trademark owners and consumers are joint producers of promotional value and goodwill). While 
Professor Gordon argues that consumers have a particularly prominent role in creating value in the 
trademark context, she acknowledges that “even standard intellectual products . . . will be beneficial 
only if someone appreciates them; labor is never the only source of value, even for Locke.” Id. 
427. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be 
Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & 
ARTS 123, 142 (1996). 
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position. As society’s notion of common ideas and “stock” elements 
evolves, so does the repository of resources made freely available to 
subsequent authors as creative infrastructure. Patent law takes the 
narrowest and most rigid approach to defining intellectual infrastructure. 
As such, it does not accommodate the reality that certain patented 
inventions can evolve from mere applications to productivity-enhancing 
infrastructure warranting liberalized access. 
This Article has drawn on eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. to 
argue that courts should take a functional approach to identifying and 
permitting unauthorized infrastructural uses of patented inventions.428 It 
proposes a two-tiered system: property rule protection for non-
infrastructural uses of patented inventions and liability rule protection—
where appropriate—for patented inventions used as infrastructure. This 
proposal encourages voluntary licensing negotiations between patentees 
and prospective licensees, reserving liability rule protection as a judicial 
backstop if such negotiations fail. Significantly, it offers a robust method 
for mediating “difficult” cases of infrastructure access where neither 
open access nor exclusive rights is adequate. Situating this analysis in 
the context of an infringement action, rather than relying on the PTO’s 
determinations of patentable subject matter upon patent issuance, allows 
courts to consider an invention’s social history in determining whether it 
should be eligible for liability rule protection. Additionally, this case-
specific analysis allows courts to craft contextually nuanced, targeted 
remedies. While this approach has general application to patented 
infrastructure, it has particular salience to foundational patented 
inventions in biotechnology and information technology. 
Comparing analogous doctrines in trademark, copyright, and patent 
law reveals the shared principle of intellectual infrastructure as a natural 
limitation on exclusive rights. Analogy to the realm of inherently public 
property and physical infrastructure further reveals that infrastructure is 
socially defined and subject to evolution, a dynamic that patent law 
currently does not accommodate. While firms, authors, and inventors 
benefit society greatly through their innovations, creating value is a 
reciprocal process. Society itself, through widespread adoption, use, and 
reliance, helps make infrastructural creations valuable. A graduated 
approach that provides compensation to upstream creators and qualified 
                                                     
428. Articulating a similar theme, the Supreme Court recently replaced the Federal Circuit’s 
“formalistic” approach to determining nonobviousness with an “expansive and flexible approach.” 
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007). 
02_LEE_FINAL.DOC 3/14/2008 1:41:54 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 83:39, 2008 
122 
access to downstream users balances the interests of both groups,429 and 
represents a valuable step towards effectuating the overarching goals of 
the intellectual property system. 
                                                     
429. Cf. Singer, The Reliance Interest, supra note 25, at 663 (arguing that property is best 
understood as mediating social relations). 
